Sede Vacante: How Ecclesiastical Offices are made Vacant

An ecclesiastical office can become vacant for the following reasons

(1) death

(2) resignation

(3) age

(4) if the office is for a fixed or temporary term, when that term comes to an end

(5) appointment to another ecclesiastical office

(6) removal

(1) is determined by natural law, of course. (2) to (6) are regulated by ecclesiastical law. (2) and (5) are voluntary, (3), (4) and (6) are compulsory.

Departure from office should be distinguished from redundancy, which occurs when the office itself ceases to exist, because it has been abolished or ‘dissolved’. No vacancy can therefore arise.

Different rules apply to different categories of officeholder

(1) Archbishops and bishops

(2) other clergy

(3) lay ministers

(4) ecclesiastical judges and legal officers

(5) parochial officers, i.e churchwardens and lay members of the parochial church council (‘the PCC’).

Among clergy (2), ecclesiastical law formerly made a sharp distinction between

(1) holding an office per se and

(2) a mere licence to officiate

A clergyman either held an office, or he held a licence. He resigned, or was removed from, office. Or he resigned his licence, or the licence was revoked.

The distinction has not disappeared. However, following the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 and the Terms of Service Measure 2009, clerical office and licence are subject to a similar regime.

All lay ministers (3) are licensees. Categories (4) and (5) are officeholders per se.

Resignation

Most ecclesiastical officeholders resign to their bishop, because he is their constitutional (‘canonical’) superior. Phillimore relates that the validity of the mediaeval Pope Celestine V’s resignation was doubted, because the Pope has no earthly superior (Ecclesiastical Law, 2nd edition 1895, p.385). Modern Roman Catholic law has now resolved this doubt (Code of Canon Law 1983, canon 332(2)).

The Terms of Service Measure 2009 simplified the resignation procedure. A deed is not required. Nor does the resignation have to be formally accepted. Diocesan officeholders on common tenure resign by giving at least 3 months’ notice, in writing, to the bishop (s.3). So the resignation becomes effective when the notice period expires. The bishop may agree to waive notice. Notice of resignation can be in electronic form (Terms of Service Regulations 2009, 17(1)).

However, the older formalities still apply to Archbishops and bishops, notwithstanding their common tenure with less senior officeholders. Bishops, including suffragans, resign to the Archbishop. This requires ‘a written instrument in the prescribed form’, though not a deed. The resignation must be accepted by the Archbishop. The Archbishop signifies acceptance by endorsing the resignation instrument with a declaration of vacancy of the bishopric from a specified date (Bishops (Retirement) Measure 1986, s.1).

The Archbishop resigns to the Monarch. If the Monarch accepts the resignation, the vacancy is declared by Order-in-Council.

The diocesan chancellor resigns to the bishop, as does the registrar (Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and Care of Churches Measure 2018, s.3(2) and s.32). However, the deputy chancellor resigns to the chancellor, not to the bishop (s.4(8)).

The Dean of the Arches and Auditor resigns to both Archbishops (2018 Measure, s.11). (He is the senior judge of both Provinces, of course.) The registrar of disciplinary tribunals resigns to the Archbishop, with a notice period of at least 12 months, though the Archbishop may allow an earlier date (2003 Measure, s.5(4)).

Churchwardens, being officers of the ordinary, resign to the bishop ‘by post’ (Churchwardens Measure 2001, s.7), so presumably an email will not be effective. Resignation takes effect after 2 months, or on an earlier date determined by the bishop.

However, PCC members do not resign to the bishop (he is not their superior), but to the secretary of the PCC (Church Representation Rules, 67).

The same person may hold more than 1 ecclesiastical office. The general rule is that departure from 1 office means departure from them all. However, the bishop may permit the incumbent of a plurality to resign 1 benefice but not the other (or others) (Mission and Pastoral Measure 2011, s.32(4)).

Age

The Ecclesiastical Offices (Age Limit) Measure 1975 provides that a clerical officeholder ‘shall vacate … office on the day on which he attains the age of 70 years’ (s.1(3)). Thus the retiring officeholder does not resign, which is a matter of words, but vacates – i.e physically withdraws from the functions and facilities of the office.

At least 6 months before a bishop turns 70, the Archbishop must proactively declare the bishopric vacant with effect from the bishop’s birthday (Bishops (Retirement) Measure 1986, s.2).

However, the Archbishop himself is trusted to retire by the due date, with no proactive action by the Monarch. Thus the Archbishop submits his resignation to the Monarch at least 6 months in advance of his birthday.

Diocesan chancellors must normally retire at 70 (2018 Measure, s.3), though they do not finally depart until they have concluded all the cases then before them (s.3(4)). The Dean of the Arches may stay until 75 (s.11). The House of Bishops is empowered to impose a lower retirement age on registrars, i.e lower than 70 (s.32).

Compulsory retirement at 70 is not an absolute rule. The appropriate superior may authorise continuance in office for a fixed or limited period: Terms of Service Regulations 29A for offices held on common tenure, the 1975 Measure for other offices. (The former Dean of Canterbury recently retired at the age of 75.) The continuance of an incumbent or priest-in-charge will require the consent of the PCC. Subject to this, they can carry on even beyond 75.

If the bishop is to continue, this will be recorded in the declaration of vacancy, i.e the declaration will record the later date, rather than the bishop’s 70th (1986 Measure, s.2).

Likewise the bishop may extend the chancellor’s tenure by up to a year at a time, subject to an absolute retirement age of 75.

The age of retirement does not apply to the Royal Peculiars, the Dean of Christ Church, Oxford, or to a residentiary canonry that is annexed to a professorship.

Fixed Term or Temporary Office

Before common tenure was introduced, many clergy held office for a fixed term of years. Fixed term was the rule for team vicars, and was also possible for team rectors, and even cathedral canons (Pastoral Measure 1983, s.20, Cathedrals Measure 1999, s.9(1)(b)). A lay member of a team ministry who is not on common tenure may still be subject to a fixed term (canons E6(1A) and E8(2A)).

Under common tenure, however, an office is usually time-limited only if it is temporary in nature, e.g to supply for the absence of a permanent officeholder, a training or probationary post, or a post subject to sponsorship funding (regulation 29). A temporary or fixed term office must be clearly identified as such to the officeholder (cf regulation 3(5)(j)).

(Roman Catholic law provides that ‘Loss of office by reason of expiry of a predetermined time … has effect only from the moment that this is communicated in writing by the competent authority’ (1983 Code, canon 186). In other words, even a fixed term appointment must still be terminated on notice. There seems to be no equivalent provision in ecclesiastical law, but perhaps one is not necessary.)

A licensed office which is linked to the holder’s employment may be terminated if the employment contract is terminated (2009 Measure, s.3(5)).

The Cathedrals Measure 2021 suggests that non-executive lay canons (as distinct from residentiary clerical canons) may be subject to fixed-term tenure (s.5(1)), though this will be determined by the constitution of the particular cathedral. (Lay canons are not subject to common tenure.)

A deputy chancellor’s tenure is tied to that of the chancellor. If the chancellor leaves office, the deputy continues to officiate, but only for 3 months (2018 Measure, s.4). The new chancellor can then decide whether or not to reappoint him.

The Deputy Dean of the Arches is temporary, but an appointment may be renewed (s.12).

Parochial offices are held for fixed terms, of course – 1 year for churchwardens, usually 3 years for PCC members, though the annual parochial meeting can decide to limit it to 1 year (Church Representation Rules, M16(2)).

Parochial offices are not subject to an age of retirement, but time limits can be imposed to their tenure. A churchwarden cannot serve more than 6 successive terms in the same parish, but can be re-elected after a year’s furlough (2001 Measure, s.3). The annual parochial meeting can impose a maximum continuous period in office for PCC members (M16(2)).

If a churchwarden retires or is not re-elected his term of office ends either

(1) when his successor is admitted to the office or

(2) 31st July

whichever is earlier (2001 Measure, s.6(2)).

PCC members are not admitted to office, so a PCC member’s term (if not re-elected) will end at the conclusion of the annual meeting (Church Representation Rules, M16(1)).

As mentioned, there is a difference between the vacation of an office and its abolition or dissolution. The Terms of Service Measure provides that an officeholder may be made redundant ‘where the office ceases to exist in consequence of a [statutory] scheme or order’ (s.3(3)).

However, the Mission and Pastoral Measure 2011, which now regulates pastoral reorganisation within the diocese, apparently permits the removal of an incumbent even when the benefice does not cease to exist.

Thus s.39(2) provides that ‘If … the benefice concerned is not vacant [but] the existing incumbent is not to hold the benefice by virtue of a designation [of a new incumbent] by the scheme … the benefice shall be deemed to be vacated …’, i.e the undesignated incumbent will have to go.

However, s.39(3) then goes on to provide that ‘the effect of vacating a benefice … is not to come into operation until … at least 6 months after … the scheme is made …’.

This wording suggests that a statutory scheme may reduce an officeholder’s tenure from an indefinite period to a temporary one, notwithstanding the protection conferred by the 2009 Measure.

Appointment to another Office – the Rule against Pluralities

Statutory authority is generally required for a person to hold 2 or more ecclesiastical offices in plurality.

S.104 of the 2011 Measure provides that, absent statutory authority, an officeholder

‘on … admission to the [new office] be deemed to vacate the office or offices previously held by him’.

(Pluralism, the unscrupulous accumulation of offices merely to acquire the property and income therefrom, was a grave abuse in the Church for many centuries.)

Halsbury’s Laws offers some clarification of the word ‘admission’ in this context

‘Strictly speaking, admission is merely the bishop’s declaration that he approves the presentee as a fit person … [but] The word is more commonly used to signify generally the actual committal of the cure to the clerk …’ (vol 34, para 628, n1).

In other words, the previous office is not vacated until legal title to the new office is conferred, whether by institution or the grant of a licence. The office is not vacated when the candidate is merely nominated to the new office.

S.104 suggests that an officeholder who is promoted is not required to resign his current office, since vacation is automatic.

The Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986 permits incumbents to exchange their benefices. Halsbury’s Laws suggests that ‘exchange only takes effect if and when both incumbents are instituted and inducted to the [new] benefices’ (para 725). If this does not happen, the exchange agreement is void and both incumbents continue in their original benefices. Either way, no vacancy is created.

The rule of automatic vacation does not apply to ecclesiastical judges, but the 2018 Measure empowers the House of Bishops to limit the number of judicial offices that may be held by 1 person at the same time (s.5(1)).

Removal

Different removal procedures apply to different categories of officeholder. It must be remembered that

(1) all clerical officeholders are subject to the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003, but

(2) not all clerical officeholders, as yet, have to be on common tenure

(3) no lay ministers are subject to the 2003 Measure and

(4) some lay ministers are on common tenure, while others are not.

Clergy All clerical officeholders, whether on common tenure or not, are liable to removal for

(1) misconduct or

(2) incapability

Misconduct

If the disciplinary tribunal makes a finding of misconduct under the 2003 Measure, it may, subject to appeal, remove the convicted clergyman from office (or revoke his licence) (s.19(1). The bishop does not have this power. Likewise, a convicted bishop or Archbishop may be removed by the Vicar General’s Court, though this must be confirmed by Order-in-Council (s.24(2)).

The bishop may remove a clergyman who is convicted of a serious criminal offence, or who is the subject of an unfavourable finding by a divorce court, or named on a ‘barred list’ (s.30). The disciplinary tribunal is not involved in this – it is based on the findings of secular authorities. The bishop’s penalty is subject to review (not appeal) by the Archbishop.

Removal in these circumstances is unusually formal. The about-to-be-removed officeholder ‘shall be entitled to be present when the penalty is imposed’ (though this may be difficult to arrange if he is in prison). The bishop ‘shall be attended by the registrar’. This formality makes the point that the bishop is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.

The removal of a bishop or Archbishop following the finding of a secular authority requires consultation with the 2 most senior bishops of the Province (s.31). However, a confirmatory Order-in-Council is not required.

It remains theoretically possible for a bishop or other clerical officeholder to be removed (or ‘deprived’) by the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved for an offence against doctrine, ritual or ceremonial, under the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1962, s.45 and s.49, though none has been in nearly 60 years.

Incapability

If the capability procedure to which common tenure is subject culminates in a final determination that the officeholder be removed, then the bishop or Archbishop must – not may – give 3 months’ notice of removal, stating the reason (2009 Measure, s.3(6)).

If an incapable bishop is removed, the Archbishop must also declare the bishopric vacant (s.3(8)).

If the Archbishop himself is found incapable, the other Archbishop gives notice, not the Monarch. However, the other Archbishop must then petition for an Order-in-Council to declare the Archbishopric vacant (s.3(7)).

Any incumbents and cathedral dignitaries who are not on common tenure remain subject to the capability procedures provided by the Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977 and the Church Dignitaries (Retirement) Measure 1949.

Lay Ministers If a lay minister is on common tenure, he can only be removed from office for the same reasons as clergy, i.e misconduct and incapability.

The capability procedure is the same as for clergy. However, a complaint of misconduct will be governed by the canons of the Church of England, not the 2003 Measure (or the 1963 Measure). The complaint is tried by the bishop, who also imposes the penalty, subject to an appeal to the Archbishop. The disciplinary tribunal is not involved.

Nor is it only the procedure which is different. Because lay ministers are subject to the canons, and not to the 2003 Measure, the definition of ‘misconduct’ in s.8 of the 2003 Measure does not automatically apply to them. (Thus there are important limits to the commonality of common tenure!) And the canons make clear that misconduct ‘includ[es] any act or omission relating to matters involving ritual, doctrine or ceremonial’.

If a lay minister is not on common tenure, the bishop can revoke the licence ‘for any cause which appears to him to be good‘, not just for misconduct or incapability, ‘after having given the [lay minister] sufficient opportunity of showing reason to the contrary’. Again, there is an appeal to the Archbishop (canons E6(3) and E8(5)).

The canons provide that a lay minister must have his licence revoked if his name appears on a barred list. The licence may also be revoked for a criminal offence against a child, but the bishop is empowered to waive such a conviction, giving reasons therefor.

Other criminal and matrimonial offences are not specifically referred to in the canons, but they may still constitute misconduct by a lay minister on common tenure, and ‘good cause’ to remove a lay minister who is not.

Judges and Legal Officers The bishop may remove the chancellor if the bishops of the Province collectively resolve that the chancellor is ‘incapable or unfit’ (2018 Measure, s.3(3)). The 2 Archbishops may likewise remove an incapable or unfit Dean of the Arches, upon resolutions by the bishops of both Provinces (s.11). The chancellor may remove his deputy, after consultation with the bishop (s.4).

The bishop may dismiss the registrar, with the consent of the Archbishop (or of the other Archbishop, in the case of a provincial registrar), even if the registrar is not considered incapable or unfit (s.32). The Archbishop may terminate the appointment of the registrar of tribunals, subject to consultation with the President of Tribunals (2003 Measure, s.5(5)).

Parochial Officers The bishop had a very limited power to disqualify churchwardens and PCC members under the Vacation of Benefices Measure 1977, if advised that they contributed to a ‘breakdown in pastoral relations’ (s.10(6)). However, this power was only very rarely used, and the 1977 Measure does not apply to incumbents on common tenure.

Churchwardens and lay PCC members cannot otherwise be removed from office by the bishop or Church court. Their mandate to officiate comes from the parishioners who elected them. (It is true that churchwardens are admitted to office by the ordinary, but this is a formality.) Their terms of office are of relatively brief duration. If found unworthy or incapable, the obvious sanction is to vote them out at the next election.

The basis of eligibility for parochial office is the electoral roll. A churchwarden or lay PCC member is automatically disqualified (therefore effectively removed from office) if his name is removed from the electoral roll, or fails to appear on a new roll (2001 Measure, s.8(1), Church Representation Rules, M15(11)).

Churchwardens and lay PCC members will also be disqualified if they are included in a barred list, or convicted of an offence against a child (rule 46). Again, the bishop has power to waive disqualification for such a conviction.

Because churchwardens and PCC members are ex officio charity trustees, they will be automatically disqualified from office if disqualified by secular authority from officiating as charity trustees (2001 Measure, s.2, cf rule M8(8)). However, disqualification is apparently not automatic for a cathedral officeholder who is ex officio a charity trustee. The bishop must disqualify such an officeholder (2009 Measure, s.3A).

The Regulation of Cathedral Property: Economic and Environmental

Cathedral property is regulated by 2 regimes, which may be described as

(1) economic, concerning the use of the property, and

(2) environmental, concerning the care and conservation thereof.

The 2 regimes are provided by 2 Church of England Measures

(1) the Cathedrals Measure 2021, the latest in a series of Measures dating back to 1931 and

(2) the Care of Cathedrals Measure 2011, which is a consolidation of 2 earlier Measures passed in 1990 and 1994.

The 2021 Measure is concerned with both regulatory regimes (1) and (2). The 2011 Measure, as its title implies, is concerned only with (2).

(2) takes precedence over (1). A cathedral is not for profit, of course. The principal objects of cathedral administration are

(1) ‘to advance the Christian religion in accordance with the faith and practice of the Church of England’ and

(2) ‘to care for and conserve the fabric and structure of the cathedral church building’ (s.4(1)).

Thus the economic regulation of cathedral property is only a means to an end. The environmental regulation is an end in itself. All property must be applied to its constitutional objects or ‘other charitable purposes which are ancillary [there]to’.

Economic regulation extends to all species of cathedral property, real and personal, corporeal and incorporeal. Environmental regulation is concerned only with physical property, i.e land, buildings and chattels.

The Regulatory Structure

Within the cathedral administration, the primary responsibility for both the use and the care of cathedral property belongs to the chapter (cf 2021 Measure, s.11(1)(f)).

As well as the chapter, every cathedral has a

(1) finance committee and

(2) CFO.

A cathedral may have a discrete ‘audit and risk’ committee, as well as a finance committee (s.16).

For environmental matters there is a

(1) fabric advisory committee (‘FAC’) and

(2) architect, or ‘surveyor of the fabric’ (2011 Measure, s.4(1) and s.5(1)(e)).

A cathedral may also have an archaeologist, if one is required (s.23).

Cathedral property is subject to the oversight of 2 national Church authorities

(1) the Church Commissioners (‘the Commissioners’), for economic matters and

(2) the Cathedrals Fabric Commission (‘CFC’), for environmental matters.

As well as ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the chapter is subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to charities (s.8(5)), and to secular charity law. Like other places of worship, cathedrals enjoy the ecclesiastical exemption from listed building control. Apart from this exemption, however, cathedrals will be subject to secular environmental law.

Classifying Cathedral Property

Neither the 2021 Measure nor the 2011 Measure makes any reference to the consecration of land or buildings. Thus the regulation of cathedral property is unaffected by whether it is consecrated or not.

The 2021 Measure defines a cathedral church building as ‘the buildings [plural] within the ecclesiastical exemption for that cathedral’ (s.4(2), also s.45(1)).

The 2011 Measure requires the chapter to prepare a plan of ‘land surrounding the cathedral church of which the fee simple [i.e freehold] is vested in the [chapter] (s.25). The CFC then defines the cathedral precinct by appropriate marking of the plan. The precinct, as defined by the CFC, consists of so much of the freehold land as is necessary to preserve or protect the character and setting of the cathedral and any associated buildings and archaeological or human remains.

Thus the chapter prepares the plan of the surrounding land, on the basis of its freehold of that land. The CFC defines the precinct on the basis of the plan.

If there are changes to the freehold, the chapter must alter the plan. The CFC in turn must redefine the precinct. It may also redefine the precinct of its own motion, even if there have been no changes to the freehold.

The chapter must also keep an inventory of all important objects belonging to the cathedral. This includes objects ‘to whose possession or custody the chapter is entitled’, even if not physically present on cathedral premises (2011 Measure, s.4(1)). ‘Important’ is defined as ‘of architectural, archaeological, artistic or historic interest’. The FAC determines what objects are of sufficient importance to be included in the inventory, after consulting the CFC (2011 Measure, s.24(4)).

All objects in the inventory are important. However, the FAC must also identify those inventory objects that is considers to be of outstanding interest. Thus there are 2 classes of inventory object

(1) important objects and

(2) outstanding objects.

If an important but hitherto unknown object is discovered (buried treasure) the CFC must be notified and the object recorded in the inventory (2011 Measure, s.7).

Thus, for environmental purposes, cathedral property is classified as

(1) cathedral and precinct (land and buildings)

(2) inventory objects (whether outstanding or merely important) or

(3) all other physical property, whether real or personal.

The chapter may of course own land and buildings outwith the cathedral precinct, and may own intangible investment property. For economic purposes, cathedral property is classified as

(1) inalienable – the cathedral itself and outstanding inventory objects (i.e physical property)

(2) permanent – i.e part of the permanent endowment of the cathedral (real and personal property) or

(3) other property, both real and personal.

Inalienable property cannot be sold or mortgaged, or even valued (s.20).

The Commissioners have jurisdiction to decide (under seal) whether property already held by, or on behalf of, the chapter (not any other property, so not affecting third party rights) is part of the permanent endowment (s.23). They can only decide on the application of the chapter, not of any third party, nor (apparently) of their own motion.

Management

The chapter prepares an annual budget and accounts (s.11(1)). It must ensure ‘appropriate oversight of … internal and external audit’ (s.5(1)(j)). Accounts must be copied to the bishop and the Commissioners. The Commissioners may order the chapter to provide additional ‘financial information’ (s.30). The cathedral’s financial year end is determined by order of the Commissioners (s.30(1)).

The bishop’s power to intervene in economic matters is limited and discretionary. He may commission a review of particular aspects of cathedral governance, including its ‘financial affairs’ (s.9(6)). The chapter must co-operate with any review (8). However, they are required only to ‘have due regard to the conclusions … and any recommendations made in the review’ (9). The chapter is not bound by a review.

The FAC, as its title implies, is supposed to advise the chapter on care and conservation matters (2011 Measure, s.4(2)(a)). The CFC gives similar advice.

There must be a 5-yearly report on works required to be done (i.e in the future) to the cathedral and any ancillary buildings. The report is based on inspections, carried out ‘as the cathedral architect or surveyor considers necessary’ (s.26). A newly appointed architect / surveyor must make ‘a full and detailed inspection’ and report within 2 years of appointment. There must also be an annual report detailing work already done and work in progress, and any other matters relevant to the cathedral’s care and conservation.

Apart from the cathedral itself there must be a 5-yearly inspection, with report, of all other property which the chapter is liable to repair and maintain. (s.27(1)).

The chapter must report annually to the FAC about the state of the inventory (s.24(3)).

Dealings – Economic

If a cathedral is also a parish church (a few are), its statutes may provide that either the whole cathedral building, or only part thereof, is to be the parish church. The ‘parish church’ may also be moved from one part of the cathedral building to another. (s.7(1)). The Commissioners may make a scheme to provide that a cathedral, or part thereof, shall cease to be a parish church (s.41(1)).

As mentioned, the cathedral itself is inalienable. Endowment property, though permanent, is not inalienable. Dealings with endowment property, will generally require the consent of the Commissioners.

Land may not be acquired or disposed of without the Commissioners’ consent, though the Commissioners may by order except minor transactions from this requirement (s.21). (The requirements of secular charity law must still be observed (s.22(6)). Borrowing against endowment requires the Commissioners’ consent (s.24). Disposal proceeds of endowment property are likewise endowment property (s.25). Endowment property may be sold for less than its full market value (s.22(7)).

Endowed funds may be invested in land or other permitted investments, and may also be used ‘for the improvement or development of property vested in the chapter’ (s.24(1)), i.e to increase its value. However, endowed funds may not be used to pay for repairs to the cathedral itself, except in an emergency. (Repairs to the cathedral will not increase its economic value, because the cathedral is inalienable, and therefore has no economic value.) Emergency repairs require the consent of the Commissioners, and there must be a scheme to replace the money spent.

The chapter may accommodate cathedral officeholders and employees without the Commissioners’ consent (s.22(3)). The chapter is the statutory ‘housing provider’ for all stipendiary cathedral clergy, from the dean down, who are subject to common tenure, and therefore must provide them with accommodation (Terms of Service Measure 2009, s.4). The chapter’s rights and duties as housing provider are prescribed by Terms of Service Regulations 12-16.

If there are still any deans and canons who are not subject to common tenure, any sale of their official residences will require their consent, so will probably have to wait until they retire. If the dean or canon is appointed by the Crown, Her Majesty’s consent will also be required, even in a vacancy (s.22(2)).

Dealings with non-endowment property will not require the consent of the Commissioners.

Dealings – Environmental

The 2011 Measure regulates works done to the cathedral, the precinct and inventory objects. It also regulates other dealings with inventory objects (2011 Measure, s.2).

The FAC and the CFC exercise a jurisdiction over the cathedral comparable to the faculty jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts over parish churches and churchyards. Any significant works or dealings will require the approval of either

(1) the FAC or

(2) the CFC

according to their impact. Permanent alterations, demolitions, disturbance of human remains, and the disposal or loan of outstanding objects are all reserved to the CFC. Less significant matters are left to the FAC to decide. Applications for approval are governed by procedural rules.

The chapter may only carry out works without approval if these do not ‘materially affect … the architectural, archaeological, artistic or historic character’ of the property.

Thus, despite its title, the FAC’s function is not merely advisory. It is a decision-making authority independent of the chapter. By contrast, the 2021 Measure does not require the approval of the finance / audit committee(s) to particular economic dealings.

Discovered ‘treasure’ may be disposed of with the CFC’s approval, but the British Museum, or another museum nominated by it, must be given first refusal (2011 Measure, s.7(4)).

An application for approval to the FAC or the CFC must come from the chapter, not a third party. The FAC and CFC each have to decide whether its own approval is required, or the other’s (or perhaps neither’s). They may determine that works of a specific class or description do not require their approval.

The Chapter may appeal an unfavourable decision of the FAC to the CFC. An appeal (or rather, review) from a decision of the CFC lies to a special Commission of Review (s.11).

Although an original application for approval can only be made by the chapter, a disappointed tenant may appeal the FAC’s or CFC’s refusal to approve works to his property (s.14).

The FAC and CFC have power to give retrospective approval for illegal works and dealings falling within their jurisdiction, i.e a confirmatory faculty (2011 Measure, s.2(3)).

Not all precinct property is necessarily within the ecclesiastical exemption. If the chapter wishes to apply for listed building consent for a non-exempt precinct building, it must notify the CFC and invite representations, but the CFC’s approval of such application is not required. The FAC and the CFC have no jurisdiction over works to any cathedral-owned buildings that are outside the precinct.

The FAC’s jurisdiction to permit the sale (or other permanent disposal) of inventory objects, as well as works thereto, may overlap with the Commissioners’ jurisdiction over endowment property. If an inventory object is classified as endowment property, the consent of both FAC and Commissioners will be required to any sale.

There is apparent inconsistency between the 2021 Measure and the 2011 Measure on dealings with outstanding objects. The 2021 Measure is adamant that such objects ‘may not be alienated’ and ‘cannot be transferred from the chapter’, unless the chapter itself ceases to exist (a most unlikely event). Even then they can be transferred only to the diocesan board of finance, nowhere else (s.20). Yet the 2011 Measure suggests that the CFC may approve ‘the sale … or other disposal of … any [outstanding] object’ (s.6(1)(iv).

Enforcement

If the chapter illegally acquires or disposes of land without the Commissioners’ consent, the transaction is prima facie void. Third parties will be protected if the conveyance includes a sealed statement by the chapter that the Commissioners’ consent is not required (s.21(6) and s.22(9). The Commissioners’ written statement of consent to such conveyance will also protect an innocent third party, if the Commissioners later complain that their consent was obtained by misrepresentation or deceit (s.21(5) and s.22(8)). However, there is no specific protection for third parties to any other illegal dealings with endowment property.

Any dispute arising from an impugned transaction would be a matter for the High Court. Likewise if the chapter considered that the Commissioners had unreasonably refused consent to a transaction, they could apply for judicial review of the refusal.

It might be thought that enforcement of the cathedral’s environmental regime could likewise be entrusted to the High Court, if the chapter regrettably engaged in unapproved works, or threatened to do so. However, the 2011 Measure provides bespoke enforcement powers (ss.15 to 20), similar to those exercised by ecclesiastical courts under the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and Care of Churches Measure 2018.

The FAC and the CFC are committees, not courts, so ill-equipped to enforce their own jurisdiction. Enforcement action is therefore taken by the bishop, who may hold a special visitation. If this proves insufficient, the Vicar-General’s court of the relevant province can issue injunctions and restoration orders. (This enforcement regime is discussed in more detail in a blogpost ‘Cathedrals and the Faculty Jurisdiction’, filed below.)

In Defence of the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003: Measure and Management

Ecclesiastical Law Society Working Party, Interim Report (September 2020)

Strong criticisms have recently been made of the disciplinary procedure provided by the 2003 Measure, both by accused clergy and their accusers.  The report cited above seeks to address these.

There seem to be 3 criticisms

(1)  delays in processing complaints

(2)  failure to communicate, i.e provide information, even about the particulars of a complaint and

(3)  lack of support for both accused and accuser.

Such treatment naturally causes distress.  It is, of course, a depressingly familiar feature of litigation and quasi-litigation.

The report observes that reform of clergy discipline has not been very successful in the past.  From 1840 to 2020 ‘a series of statutes and Measures introduced new offences and new [disciplinary] processes … a repeated pattern over 180 years: dissatisfaction with the then current system led to the introduction of a new one, only for that itself to be the subject of criticism not long after it was brought into effect’ (para 10).

Another commentator took an even longer view of history: ‘devising a thoroughly satisfactory system of ecclesiastical courts … [is] a problem which has baffled the best brains of Christendom for more than 1000 years’ (Crockford Prefaces, OUP 1947, p.18).

The Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 was the principal statute regulating clergy discipline prior to the 2003 Measure.  30 years later, Moore’s Introduction to English Canon Law drily observed that the 1963 Measure ‘swept away a number of tribunals and procedures … The machinery which has gone was complicated and cumbersome.  The machinery which has taken its place is, unfortunately, no less so’ (3rd edition, 1993, pp119-120).

The protection afforded by the cumbersome 1963 Measure applied only to beneficed clergy.  Licensed clergy were at the mercy of their bishops.  Canon C12(5) originally provided that ‘Any bishop may revoke summarily and without further process, any licence … for any cause which shall appear to him to be good and reasonable …’.  The bishop was required to hear the licensee first, and the licensee had a right of appeal to the Archbishop.  However, the bishop did not have to prove misconduct, and the licensee had no right to an independent court or tribunal.

Sir Mark Hedley observed that ‘The Clergy Discipline Measure … whatever its defects … is at least better than what had gone before 2003’ (‘Practical Aspects of the Clergy Discipline Measure’ Lecture, October 2017).  The report does not deny that the 2003 Measure is indeed an improvement on the previous 1963 regime.  It provides a single disciplinary regime for both beneficed and licensed clergy (cf.s.8(2)).  Disputed complaints have to be tried and punished by a tribunal, not by the bishop.  As the report observes, ‘bishop’s disciplinary tribunals are, despite the nomenclature, truly independent bodies over whose decisions … the bishop has no control’ (para 9).

Not only the trial but also the prior investigation of the complaint is independent of the bishop.  It is carried out by the designated officer, a national official.  The holder of that office observed that the designated officer ‘is [not] counsel for the complainant … [but] is independent of the complainant … and the bishop … [like] counsel for the Crown in a criminal trial, [the designated officer] puts the case for the victim but … does not represent the victim, and … acts impartially throughout’ (Adrian Iles, ‘The Clergy Discipline Measure 2003’ (2007) 9 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 10, p.19)

Thus, by improving on its predecessor, the 2003 Measure has rather bucked the trend of the last 180 years (perhaps even the last 1000 years!).  A proposal for changing it should therefore be treated with especial caution.

Nevertheless the report makes 2 criticisms of the Measure

(1) the wide ambit of ecclesiastical offences / misconduct

(2) the absence of a procedure for dealing with minor complaints and grievances, ‘a major error’ (para 7).

In practice, it seems that almost all disciplinary complaints are concerned with the vicar’s behaviour, rather than specific breaches of duty or disobedience.  The Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 provided an offence of ‘conduct unbecoming the office and work of a clerk in Holy Orders’ (s.14(1)).  The Clergy Discipline Measure broadened this offence to ‘conduct unbecoming or inappropriate … ‘ (s.8(1)).

It may be doubted whether the word ‘inappropriate’ really adds anything much to ‘unbecoming’.  However, the ambit of misconduct is undeniably very wide.  The slightest clerical faux pas could be described as ‘inappropriate conduct’.

Despite the apparent criticism, the report does not propose a narrowing of the ecclesiastical offence.  It wisely rejects a regime of ‘detailed rules and regulations and fleshing out of principles’ of what does or does not constitute inappropriate behaviour (para 42).  Such a regime would be ‘too interventionist in [clergy] personal lives and too restrictive of their practice of ministry’ (para 42).  It would create an undesirable bureaucracy or ‘industry’ of ‘professional expertise’ (para 46).

Hedley pointed out in his lecture that ‘standards of behaviour required of the clergy are necessarily high’.  But it is necessary to distinguish minor, though genuine, grievances about a vicar’s lapses of tact and courtesy from more serious matters.

Therefore, despite its professed caution about legislative reform (‘We are acutely aware of the risk …’ (para 10)), the report proposes 2 quite radical changes to the Clergy Discipline Measure:

(1) a new preliminary stage for assessing complaints when they are first made and

(2) the creation of 2 ‘tracks’ for processing misconduct case – 1 track for ‘lesser’ misconduct, another for ‘serious’ misconduct.

At present, the 2003 Measure provides that a complaint is referred to the registrar for preliminary scrutiny (s.11).  This scrutiny is limited to ‘forming a view as to whether or not …

[1] the [complainant] has a proper interest … and …

[2] there is sufficient substance in the complaint to justify proceeding with it’.

The report proposes that the complaint should instead be referred, not to the registrar, but to an assessor.  The assessor may be ‘a lay person who from their own secular work experience has [appropriate] skills’.  Or the bishop could appoint an archdeacon to be the assessor (para 91).

The assessor’s complaint handling function will be considerably greater in scope than the registrar’s preliminary scrutiny.  The assessor will not merely scrutinise the written complaint, but actually institute an enquiry on the basis of it.  He will speak to both the complainant and the accused clergyman (para 94).  Both parties ‘would be asked to provide the assessor with evidence in support of their respective contentions’ (para 95).

Having completed this enquiry, the assessor will report to the bishop.  The bishop may then proceed as follows

(1) attempting conciliation / resolution

(2) dismissing the complaint

(3) to ‘having concerns about the health of the cleric’

(4) or ‘having concerns about the capability of the cleric’ or

(5) finding misconduct.

Thus the enquiry will not necessarily be limited to the specific complaint.  It extends to the accused clergyman’s health and general capability for office.

(1) is evidently the preferred course.  The assessor will be expected to settle the dispute between the parties, as well as investigate it, if possible (para 98).

However, if misconduct is found (per (5)), the bishop will then have to decide ‘whether it is serious or lesser misconduct, and allocate it to the appropriate ‘track’ (para 111).

Serious cases will continue to be dealt with by reference to a tribunal.  However, lesser misconduct cases that cannot be settled by agreement will be decided by the bishop alone, on the basis of the assessor’s report (para 115).

The report proposes that ‘the bishop should have the power to impose penalties, without consent, penalties falling short of prohibition … principally rebuke and injunction, and might also include conditional deferment’ (para 116).  (At present, conditional deferment is only possible with consent.)  An administrative rather than a judicial procedure.  Inquisitorial not adversarial.  No tribunal and no lawyers.  The report candidly admits that ‘our proposal [is] to keep out lawyers’ (para 118).  However, the penalised clergyman would have a right of review or appeal (para 119).

These proposals are hardly favourable to accused clergy.  The assessor’s enquiry is bound to take longer than the registrar’s scrutiny.  The activism of the assessor’s function may result in additional complaints to the one which prompted the enquiry.  It may even start a bandwagon rolling, positively encouraging parishioners to complain.

Empowering the bishop to impose penalties unilaterally, without consent, is a major reversal of the policy of the Clergy Discipline Measure.  This proposal would repatriate powers from the tribunal to the bishop.  It is a chilling echo of the pre-2003 regime over licensed clergy.

It is true that the bishop could not actually remove an accused clergyman from office.  But an injunction is still an interference with the clergyman’s tenure.  Conditional deferment of a complaint will also prejudice tenure if a subsequent complaint is made.  The clergyman’s career and reputation will be damaged.

Hedley suggested in his lecture that, when processing complaints, ‘the question of threshold needs to be addressed’ i.e the ‘threshold’ from minor to serious misconduct.  It is not clear how a 2 track procedure will identify this threshold, any more than the present 1 track procedure.  As mentioned, the report eschews detailed definitions of misconduct.

But the procedure (as proposed) would certainly alter the threshold.  Under the 2003 Measure, serious misconduct is any misconduct that would attract any penalty.  Minor misconduct is conduct that would not attract a penalty.

According to the report’s penalties-based definition, ‘serious misconduct’ is misconduct that would justify a prohibition or loss of office.  ‘Minor misconduct’ is misconduct that may justify either a less serious penalty or no penalty.  There are 2 possible consequences of this definition

(1) an allegation of serious misconduct will be treated as if it was minor misconduct, with the accused being denied the protection currently provided by the 2003 Measure to defend the allegation and / or

(2) minor misconduct will be dealt with more severely than it is at present.

Admittedly the boundary between serious and minor misconduct is not absolute under the 2003 Measure.  The mildest penalty available to a tribunal is a rebuke.  The report Under Authority (1996), whose proposals formed the basis of the 2003 Measure, acknowledged that ‘a prosecution that leads only to a rebuke is probably a prosecution which should not have been brought’ (p.98).  However, it is certainly the policy of the Measure that any alleged misconduct that would attract a penalty more serious than rebuke should be dealt with by the tribunal.

Such proposals to reform the Clergy Discipline Measure are undesirable in themselves.  It is further argued that reform of the Measure is not necessary to distinguish between serious and minor cases.  Common sense and experience should suffice to determine whether a complaint is concerned with the vicar’s shortage of interpersonal skills or with something more serious.

Iles notes that ‘complaints based on disagreements and grievances, however genuine, are not disciplinary matters, and the [Clergy] Discipline Commission urges bishops to dismiss them, along with complaints alleging acts or omissions amounting to minor misconduct.  Bishops are encouraged to take a fairly robust approach … and to be alert to the possibility of resolving a complaint … by non-disciplinary means … where appropriate’ (‘The Clergy Discipline Measure 2003: A Progress Report’ Ecclesiastical Law Journal, January 2014, p.5.).  An eminently sensible policy.

There is nothing in the 2003 Measure to prevent the bishop from taking advice from others, in addition to the registrar, on what to do with a complaint.  Nor does the Measure prevent the bishops collectively from agreeing a common approach.

When disposing of a minor complaint, the bishop does not need statutory powers to rebuke a tactless incumbent, or to suggest, and facilitate, conciliation.  (Conciliation is, by definition, consensual, requiring the acquiescence of both parties to the dispute.)

A minor complaint may indeed give rise to concerns about a clergyman’s general capability, including his health.  But the report itself admits (para 105) that a statutory capability procedure already exists, under the Terms of Service Measure 2009 and the rules made thereunder.  The 2009 regime also provides for regular performance appraisal of clergy (‘ministerial development review’) and for continuing education.

It is likely that the silence of the 2003 Measure concerning minor misconduct was based on the assumption that this would be dealt with by what became the Terms of Service Measure 2009.  Serious misconduct to be dealt with by the 2003 Measure.  Minor misconduct by the 2009 Measure.

It is further argued that the Clergy Discipline Measure per se is not to blame for the current criticisms of the disciplinary procedure.  There is nothing in the 2003 Measure that necessitates delay or prevents communication with, and support for, the parties to a disciplinary case.  Reforming or repealing the Measure would therefore not cure these shortcomings.

The Measure actually includes provisions that are intended to avoid delay.  It prescribes time limits of 28 days for processing complaints, though allowing for extensions (ss11 and 12).  A busy registrar is expressly empowered to delegate ‘any or all of his functions [of preliminary scrutiny] to such person as he may delegate’ (s.11(6)).

The 2003 Measure makes provision for disciplinary cases that also involve the secular authorities – the police, the courts, ‘safeguarding’ authorities.  These authorities may well take a very long time to process a case, and this will inevitably place an accused person under great strain.  But of course secular procedures are outwith the scope of any ecclesiastical legislation.

So what should the Church do to address the admitted criticisms of its own procedures?  (The report evidently accepts that the criticisms are justified.)

It is argued that the correct response is, not legislative reform, but administrative or managerial reform.  It may be embarrassing to say so, but responsibility for the admitted shortcomings lies, not with the Clergy Discipline Measure per se, but with the persons whose duty it is to administer the Measure.  The solution therefore lies in the management of such persons.  This requires a company doctor, not a legislative draftsman.

The report obliquely refers to the difficulty.  It remarks, somewhat feebly, that ‘the current capability procedures [under the 2009 Measure] … are not well understood and appear to be rarely used’ (para 105).  The answer to that problem is effective managerial action to ensure that the procedures do become well understood and properly used, not to legislate for yet more procedures.

The report itself is interesting to read and provides welcome food for thought (after many hungry months for this blog).  But still, its conclusions are, with respect, on the wrong track.

The Diocesan Board of Finance: Constitution, Custody and Management

The property of an English diocese may be divided into 4 categories

(1) parochial (i.e parish property)

(2) benefice

(3) episcopal and

(4) cathedral.

The Diocesan Board of Finance (henceforward ‘DBF’) is only concerned with (1) and (2).  (3) is now the responsibility of the Church Commissioners (cf Episcopal Endowments and Stipends Measure 1943).  (4) is the responsibility of the Cathedral Corporation, though subject to some oversight by the Church Commissioners.

Constitution

The Diocesan Boards of Finance Measure 1925 requires every diocese to have a DBF.  However, the 1925 Measure did not invent DBFs.  They have probably existed since Victorian times.  Introducing the Measure to the House of Commons, Lord Hugh Cecil observed that ‘There are [already], all over England, diocesan boards of finance, and it is desired by this Measure to bring them all under one form’ i.e constituted as companies (Hansard vol 189, 16th December 1925).

The DBF must be incorporated as a company under the Companies Acts. This is in contrast to the parochial church council, which is a statutory body corporate, but not a company. Other ecclesiastical committees, if required to be incorporated, are statutory corporations, not companies.

Why are DBFs different?  The evident policy of the 1925 Measure was to permit local flexibility and discretion.  Thus the Measure provides that the DBF’s constitution may ‘confer … such further powers on the [DBF] as the diocesan synod … may think necessary or expedient in view of the requirements of the diocese’ (s.1(2)(c)). A Church of England report observed that ‘the diocesan synod has considerable discretion as to the constitution of its DBF … DBF constitutions … show a wide variety of provisions governing membership of a DBF and … [its] directors’ (DBFs: Conflicts of Interest, para 1).

The DBF’s title may cause confusion.  A DBF is called a board, but it is constituted as a company.  There is, of course, an important legal distinction between a company and its board of directors.

The bishop must be a member of the DBF (though not necessarily its chairman). A majority of the DBF’s members must be

(1) elected, either by the diocesan synod or by the deanery synods of the diocese

(2) members of the diocesan synod (membership of a deanery synod will not suffice) and

(3) laymen (or laywomen).

The DBF, then, is constituted by the diocesan synod, and is accountable to it.  The 1925 Measure provides that the DBF ‘shall in the exercise of its powers and duties comply with such directions as may be given to [it] by the diocesan synod’ (s.3(1)).

S.19 of the Dioceses, Pastoral and Mission Measure 2007 suggests that it is possible for 2 or more DBFs to discharge their functions jointly, or delegate their functions to each other.  It is also possible for 2 or more dioceses to create a single, interdiocesan DBF.  Such interdiocesan arrangements concerning ‘any body corporate or unincorporate or committee … other than a diocesan synod or bishop’s council’ (s.19(1)) require the authority of a statutory scheme made by the bishops concerned, with the approval of their respective diocesan synods, and of the Charities Commission.

The 1925 Measure does not mention the Church Commissioners (or Ecclesiastical Commissioners as they were then known).  However, as the DBF’s responsibilities have broadened since 1925, so it has become subject to the oversight of the Church Commissioners, as well as the local synod.

Thus the Church Property Measure 2018 obliges DBFs to provide information required by the Church Commissioners on any matter concerning its functions under that Measure.  And the DBF must ‘have regard’ to any advice tendered by the Commissioners concerning those functions (s.40).

Function

The DBF has broad powers ‘to hold real and personal property for purposes connected with the Church of England’, and ‘to transact business in connection with the Church of England and the diocese …’ (1925 Measure, s.1(2)).  In practice, the DBF’s principal responsibility today is the maintenance of ministry in the diocese, and hence to acquire sufficient property and income to achieve this.  Also to meet its own office expenses, and certain other diocesan expenses. However, it is argued that parochial and benefice property are the nucleus of the DBF’s function.

Parish property ((1) above) may be subdivided into

(1) property regulated by the Parochial Church Councils (Powers) Measure 1956.  This includes ‘property … applicable to purposes connected with [the] powers, duties or liabilities’ of the parochial church council (‘the PCC’) (s.4(3)).  Also property acquired property acquired by the PCC ‘for any ecclesiastical purpose affecting the parish’, or for ‘educational schemes’ (s.5(1)).  Such property is likely to consist principally of a church hall and parish funds.

(2) property regulated by the Incumbents and Churchwardens (Trusts) Measure 1964.  This is property ‘held on [specific] charitable trusts, established for ecclesiastical purposes’, of which trusts the incumbent and churchwardens are ex officio trustees (s.2), e.g trusts for the provision of religious education.

Benefice property ((2) above) comprises

(1) the church and churchyard

(2) the parsonage (i.e the official residence of the incumbent)

(3) other official residences and

(4) glebe, which provided the incumbent’s income.

(Tithe and tithe rentcharge have now been abolished.)

Some dealings will affect all species of parochial and benefice property.  Parishes and benefices, and hence their property, are regularly subject to reorganisation under statutory powers now contained in the Mission and Pastoral Measure 2011.  The DBF is required to hold a pastoral account, for the income and expenses of a reorganisation (2011 Measure, ss.93 and 94).  A reorganisation proposal is required to consider ‘the financial implications for the diocese’ (s.3(2)), but (perhaps surprisingly) the DBF is not required to be consulted about a reorganisation, except where this involves the closure of a church (s.21(7)).

Parochial and benefice property may also be subject to a sharing agreement, made with other Christian denominations under the Sharing of Church Buildings Act 1969.  The 1969 Act provides that the DBF must be a party to such an agreement (s.1(3)), so will be able to influence its terms and performance.

The DBF has a general power to buy or otherwise acquire, and to grant, land and buildings for use as a church or other place of worship, or as a churchyard, church hall and parsonage (Church Property Measure 2018, s.28).  The 2018 Measure also provides for the grant of land to the DBF for such uses (ss.29-31).

(1)  The Parish

The PCC may not acquire, sell or otherwise deal with land (other than short leases) or trust property without the DBF’s consent.  To ensure that this rule is observed, such land or trust property must be transferred to, or become vested in, the DBF as legal owner (1956 Measure, s.6).  Nevertheless, the PCC remains responsible for all liabilities and outgoings relating to the property (s.6(4)).  A similar rule applies to trust property regulated by the 1964 Measure.

These rules reflect the distinction found in trust law between (1) custody and (2) management.  The DBF is custodian of parish property, while the parochial authorities are its managers.

Minor dealings with parish property below a certain specified value will not require the DBF’s consent (1956 Measure, s.6(4A), 1964 Measure, s.5A).

Parish accounts must be laid before the DBF annually (1956 Measure, s.8(4)).

The DBF has custody of parochial land and trust property, but it has no charge over parish funds (e.g bank deposits and ‘personal’ investments that are not subject to a specific trust).  However, it has long been the practice (again, perhaps since Victorian times) for parishes to make an annual contribution to diocesan expenses.  This is known as the parish share or quota.  It is possible to see, proudly displayed on a church noticeboard, a ‘certificate’, signed by the grateful bishop, and ‘presented in recognition and appreciation of your [parish] share’.

The Synodical Government Measure 1969 makes an oblique reference to the practice: ‘the diocesan synod [may] delegate to the deanery synods … the determination of parochial shares’ (s.5(4)).  Thus, unlike most charitable giving, the parish does not simply decide what it wants to donate. The local synod assesses what it should pay.

Roman Catholic law empowers the bishop to impose a ‘moderate tax’ (tributum) on parishes ‘proportionate to their income … for diocesan needs’ (Code of Canon Law 1983, canon 1263).  This taxing power apparently originated in the cathedraticum, a payment made ‘as a sign of … subjection to … episcopal authority’ (The Code of Canon Law.  A Text and Commentary, eds Coriden, Green and Heintschel, New York 1985, p.866).  Perhaps the Anglican parish quota / share was inspired by this Catholic custom.  However, though the quota / share assessment may resemble a charge or tax, payment of it is purely voluntary.  The wording of the 1969 Measure does not empower the synod to enforce payment of its assessment, and there is no other statutory provision for enforcement.

Parish property, including trust property, can be appropriated (i.e converted) into glebe, but the PCC or trustees, and the Charities Commission, must consent to this (s.19(3)).

Where a joint PCC of 2 or more parishes is either created or dissolved, the DBF resolves any question that may arise concerning the property, rights, liabilities or functions of the PCCs concerned (Church Representation Rules, as amended by the Church Representation and Ministers Measure 2019).

If there is a dispute over an entry on the parish electoral roll, or over the outcome of a synodical election, the DBF may be liable to meet the legal expenses of resolving the dispute (ibid).

(2) Church and Churchyard

The DBF has less direct responsibility for churches (and churchyards) than any other parochial or benefice property.  It is neither custodian nor manager.  The incumbent and churchwardens have custody of the church and its contents, while the care of the church is now the financial responsibility of the PCC.  Dealings with the parish church are subject to the oversight of the archdeacon and the ecclesiastical courts (under the faculty jurisdiction).  Any grants or loans made by the DBF are discretionary.

The statute law follows the common law rule of ownership.  Thus land acquired by the DBF for use as a church or churchyard automatically vests in the incumbent (2018 Measure, s.32).

However, the Ecclesiastical Fees (Amendment) Measure 2011 provided that fees (traditionally known as ‘surplice fees’) that were formerly payable to the incumbent (eg for weddings and funerals) should in future be paid to the DBF.  This was a sensible reform, as the DBF is now responsible for clergy remuneration, and incumbents should not be paid twice for the same work (a fortiori they should not be paid for work done by other clergy who deputise for them).  These fees are the only statutory, compulsory income that the DBF receives.

An agreement between a PCC and a lay rector to compound the latter’s liability to repair the chancel (i.e get rid of the liability in return for a lump sum payment) requires the DBF’s approval (Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Measure 1923, s.52).

Every diocese must establish a fund to meet the cost of inspecting churches (Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction and Care of Churches Measure 2018, s.45(2)).  The DBF is the obvious body to hold and administer this fund, though this is not explicitly provided for.  The DBF must also meet the expenses of the diocesan advisory committee, which advises on the care of churches (s.37(10)).  If the bishop or archdeacon intervenes in faculty proceedings, the DBF is responsible for their legal expenses, provided it has been consulted in advance (s.60(4-6)).

The DBF has little direct responsibility for a functioning parish church, but considerable responsibility for a church which has been closed, i.e made redundant, under the Mission and Pastoral Measure 2011.

The precise terms of the DBF’s involvement with a closed church will depend on the particular statutory scheme of closure.  However, the DBF is usually responsible for the contents of a closed church, pending their disposal (s.76).  The ownership and management of a closed church may be transferred to the DBF pending sale, or on a permanent basis, perhaps for commercial use and profit (s.63).  If no further use can be found for a closed church, the DBF may be entrusted with the melancholy task of demolishing it (s.58(2)).

(3)  Parsonages

Parsonages, like churches and churchyards, vest in the incumbent, not the DBF.  As with a church, any parsonage acquired by the DBF will automatically vest in the incumbent (2018 Measure, s.32).  Thus the DBF, qua DBF, is neither custodian nor manager of parsonages.

The Repair of Benefice Buildings Measure 1972 requires every diocesan synod to appoint a parsonages board to manage parsonages (s.1).  (Parsonages boards were formerly known as dilapidations boards, but the 1972 Measure abolished this depressing title.)  The diocesan synod has the right to designate the DBF itself as the parsonages board.  If the DBF is designated as parsonages board, it must delegate its managerial functions under the 1972 Measure to a special committee (or committees).

As the parsonage vests in the incumbent, and not the DBF, the DBF has no power to sell a parsonage.  However, the surplus proceeds of any sale belong to the DBF (Church Property Measure 2018, s.13(1)).

Also, if the DBF is opinion that a parsonage house or land ‘is not required [for] the incumbent’s … convenient occupation’, it may request that the property be transferred to itself, and held as glebe (Church Property Measure 2018, s.8).  If the Commissioners and the bishop agree, the bishop may then order the transfer of the parsonage to the DBF, even if the incumbent objects, without the need for any further conveyance (s.8).

As a general rule, parsonage land cannot now be leased.  If not required for the incumbent’s residence, it must be transferred to the DBF as glebe. However, during a vacancy in the benefice, the DBF may agree to the benefice sequestrators leasing the parsonage.  Any profit left over when the benefice is filled must be paid to the DBF (s.37(1)).

There may also be some old leases of parsonage land, granted by incumbents before the Endowments and Glebe Measure 1976 took effect.  The incumbent remains the nominal landlord of such a lease.  However, the DBF effectively manages the lease.  It is entitled to information from the incumbent or sequestrators concerning leased parsonage land (s.6).  The rent must be paid to the DBF (s.7), and is treated as the DBF’s income, not the incumbent’s.  For its part, the DBF, not the incumbent, meets all the costs of the landlord’s obligations and liabilities.

(4)  Other Official Residences

Non-incumbent parochial clergy (assistant curates, team vicars etc) do not own their official residences.  If a curate’s house is supplied by the PCC, or by a parochial trust, it will vest in the DBF as custodian, under the 1956 or 1964 Measures discussed earlier.

An official residence may also be acquired and held by the DBF in its own right.  The Diocesan Boards of Finance Measure 1925, as amended, provides that the DBF may not alter or dispose of a team minister’s residence without informing and consulting that minister (s.3(2)).

The Ecclesiastical Offices (Terms of Service) Measure 2009 provides that the parsonages board, not the DBF, is ‘housing provider’ for all non-incumbent diocesan officeholders who are entitled to housing as part of their ‘common tenure’ (s.4(7)).  As housing provider, the parsonages board now has similar responsibility for managing other official residences as it has for parsonages (cf Terms of Service Regulations 2011, reg 12).

As mentioned, the DBF may also be the parsonages board.  If it is not, the parsonages board has an independent power to hold property (1972 Measure, s.1(5)).  However, the common tenure regime does not require the parsonages board to be the legal owner of the housing that it provides.  ‘Housing provider‘ does not necessarily mean ‘housing owner‘.  It should be possible for a parsonages board to provide and manage a residence that is legally owned by the DBF.

(4)  Glebe

The most significant extension of the DBF’s functions since 1925 occurred when the Endowments and Glebe Measure 1976 transferred all benefice glebe to the DBF (by s.15).  Hitherto the glebe had vested in the individual incumbents and been managed from London by the Church Commissioners.

The effect of the 1976 Measure was to convert benefice glebe into diocesan glebe, making it the investment property of the entire diocese.  The DBF’s function was ‘to hold, manage and deal with the diocesan glebe land for the benefit of the diocesan stipends fund‘, i.e clergy remuneration.

The Church Property Measure 2018 makes a distinction between 2 types of glebe

(1) historic glebe, which vested in the DBF under s.15 of the Endowments and Glebe Measure 1976 and

(2) glebe held under the 2018 Measure or its predecessors, or under a reorganisation scheme (s.48(6)), i.e property acquired by the DBF after the 1976 Measure came into force.

The parish share, discussed above, is income.  The glebe, by contrast, is capital, a portfolio of capital assets.  The DBF’s functions concerning glebe are different from those concerning parish property.  While the DBF has custody of parish property, it is required ‘to hold, manage and deal with the diocesan glebe land for the benefit of the Diocesan Stipends Fund’ (s.16(1)).  The DBF both owns and manages the glebe.

To this end the DBF must have a scheme for the management of glebe land (s.17).  In managing and dealing with glebe, the DBF is itself subject to the oversight of the Church Commissioners.  Any changes to a management scheme require the Commissioners’ consent (s.17).  The Commissioners may even suspend a scheme if it is not being complied with, or not achieving ‘efficient management’ (s.18(1)), effectively putting the DBF into ‘special measures’.  The DBF is also required to report to the Commissioners on ‘such matters as the Commissioners specify’, and transactions concerning glebe (s.16(2)).

Some dealings with glebe (sale, lease, mortgage) may require the consent of the Commissioners.  However, consent is not required if the dealing is an arm’s-length commercial transaction and the DBF is advised by a qualified surveyor (s.21).  The same rules apply to the purchase of land by the DBF (s.28).  The relevant PCC and clergy must be notified of a proposed dealing (s.22).  Disposal proceeds must be allocated to the stipends fund.  The DBF must keep appropriate accounts (s.26(5) and (6)).

The DBF is empowered to require an incumbent or benefice sequestrators to provide information and documents concerning historic glebe ((1) above) in their area, and may even take them to court if they neglect to comply (s.16(4) and (5)).

Any dispute between the DBF and an incumbent or sequestrators concerning the historic glebe ‘or rights … to which the land was subject or of which it had the benefit’ is decided by the Commissioners.

Although the ownership and management of glebe was transferred to the DBF by the 1976 Measure, the Commissioners continued to hold the diocesan stipends fund for many years thereafter.  Not until the Miscellaneous Provisions Measure 2000 were the funds transferred to the DBFs (s.1(1)).  The funds are regulated by the Diocesan Stipends Fund 1953, as amended.

As well as stipends, the DBF is responsible for certain compensation payments to clergy for loss of office.  Compensation for officeholders who are made redundant as a result of pastoral reorganisation is regulated by Schedule 4 of the Mission and Pastoral Measure 2011.  An incumbent who is removed under the Vacation of Benefices Measure 1977 (though this hardly ever happens) is also entitled to compensation.

An officeholder who is dismissed for incapability under the ‘common tenure’ regime can bring a claim of unfair dismissal in the (secular) Employment Tribunal.  The DBF is respondent to such a claim and hence liable for any compensation awarded (Terms of Service Regulations 2011, reg 33).

The DBF also has an increasing responsibility for clergy pensions (and those of lay ministers).  The Pensions Measure 1997 provided that, while the Commissioners continue to be responsible for pension contributions in respect of pre-1997 service, the DBF is required to contribute to the post-1997 pension fund held by the central Pensions Board (Pensions Measure 2018, ss.9 and 10).

As part of its pension responsibilities, the DBF must appoint a widows and dependants committee, and a special officer to represent the interests of widows and dependants (2018 Measure, s.51).

The Crockford Preface 1987: Thirty Years On

The Preface excited remarkable interest and controversy.  By a longstanding custom, its author was anonymous.  However, even in those pre-internet days, anonymity was difficult to maintain in the face of relentless media attention.  The then Archbishop of York, Dr John Habgood, publicly condemned the ‘sourness and vindictiveness’ of the Preface, and the ‘scurrilous charges’ that it supposedly made.  Unnerved by the storm of controversy, and threatened with exposure, the author took his own life.

He was subsequently identified as the Reverend Dr Gareth Bennett (1929-1987), Oxford don and priest of the Church of England.  His Preface is 40 pages long.  It was republished in a posthumous collection of his work, To The Church of England (1988, at pp.189-228), edited by Geoffrey Rowell, a sympathetic colleague.  (Bishop Rowell himself died, of natural causes, earlier this year.)

At about the same time, Archbishop Habgood published a more measured assessment of the Preface, in Confessions of a Conservative Liberal (1988, at pp.82-91).  However, the tragic denouement of the controversy damaged his reputation, and may even have cost him the succession to St. Augustine’s Chair when it became vacant 3 years later.

Dr Bennett saw his task as the provision of ‘an informed and critical account of the state of the Anglican Communion and the Church of England in particular’ (p.189).  Hence the need for anonymity.  Anonymity made possible ‘the scrutiny of a writer who is given complete independence’ (p.190).

His essential criticism of ecclesiastical governance was that it fails to enable adequate consultation.  Improved consultation will improve the quality of ecclesiastical governance, by making it more cohesive and inclusive.

The Preface identifies 3 specific failures of consultation, within:

(1)  the Anglican Communion

(2)  the synods of the Church of England and

(3)  the Crown Appointments Commission (now called the Crown Nominations Commission), which nominates diocesan bishops to the Crown.  It was this that caused all the controversy.

(1) The Anglican Communion

The Preface begins with a survey of the fragmented state of the Anglican Communion.  Anglicanism began in England, of course, and the word ‘Anglican’ really means ‘English’.  The Church ‘followed the flag’ as the British Empire spread across the globe.

Bennett observed that ‘The Englishness of the Communion is not what it was … with the spread of American influence and the natural desire of African and Asian dioceses to break with their colonial past and develop their own indigenous styles’.  The Book of Common Prayer and its derivatives have fallen into ‘virtual disuse’ (p.197), and the new liturgies ‘have distinct doctrinal differences from each other’ (p.198).  This prompts the rhetorical question: ‘without its English style what does keep the Communion together?’ (p.197).

Another fragmenting force is the rejection of classical High Anglican theology, which found the Church’s authority in the Bible as this was interpreted in the life and practice of the Early Church (p.191).  Theologians now suggest that the authorities of the Early Church are too obscure, happened too long ago, and in too different circumstances, to guide the modern Church (cf p.200).  Modern man is therefore condemned ‘[to] live amid the ruins of past doctrinal and ecclesiastical systems, looking to the Scriptures only for themes and apprehensions which may inform [him] … ‘ (pp.200-1).

The existing pan-Anglican consultative bodies are not capable of arresting this process of fragmentation.  The Archbishop of Canterbury is no more than ‘an honoured guest’ outside England.  The Primates’ Meeting ‘lack[s] the authority to make major recommendations’ (p.203).  The ordination of women (still a novelty at that time) has undermined the unifying collegial function of the bishops: ‘the episcopal ministry … the focus of unity, has become a focus for Anglican disunity’ (p.199).

Bennett therefore argued for ‘a reconstituted [Anglican] Consultative Council … to meet more frequently, have an adequate secretariat and the assistance of theologians and experts … there will have to be some self-denying ordinance by which the provinces agree that certain matters should not be decided locally but only after a common mind has been established among the Churches’ (pp.203-4).  Thus Churches with very different cultural values would be forced to listen to each other.

This, of course, anticipated the conclusions of the Windsor Report of 2004, which fell flat.  Its proposal for a pan-Anglican ‘Council of Advice’ and an ‘Anglican Communion Covenant’ is really a more elaborate version of Bennett’s proposal.

Archbishop Habgood generously described the analysis of the Anglican Communion as the ‘best part’ of the Preface (p.87), though he did not endorse Bennett’s proposal.  The failure of the Windsor Report may have vindicated him on this point.  Instead, the Archbishop founded his hope for the Communion on a pan-Anglican ‘doctrine commission’ that had recently been established, but this body (if it still exists) has not been conspicuously successful either.

(2) Synodical Government

Bennett was not the first to point out that the House of Laity of the General Synod is not very representative of its constituency.  Ordinary churchgoers cannot elect its members, they can only elect those who do.  The House of Clergy is more representative, but even there the representative quality is diminished by the large number of ex officio members.

However, his most important point was that the General Synod has very little control of ecclesiastical governance.  He observed that, though the House of Commons can vote the government out of office, ‘the General Synod, by contrast, finds itself faced with a government of the Church which is almost wholly independent of it’ (p.212).

The bishops are not accountable to the General Synod in the way that ministers of the secular state are accountable to Parliament.  Ministers have to answer parliamentary questions and give evidence to select committees concerning the exercise of their responsibilities.  There is no equivalent scrutiny of bishops.

It is true that ecclesiastical legislation (Measures, canons and subordinate legislation) requires the Synod’s approval, but there is not much of this, and it is mostly uncontroversial.  Hence ‘most of the debates … are … on reports from various boards or committees … motions … whether passed or amended, lead to no action at all’ (p.212).

The General Synod’s constitution confirms its freedom (of which it takes full advantage) ‘to consider and express [its members’] opinion on any other matters of religious or public interest’ (Synodical Government Measure 1969, sch2(6)(b)).  But what does this have to do with the governance of the Church?

Synodical government is a misnomer if the synods do not govern the Church.  There is a well-known axiom that the Church of England is ‘episcopally led and synodically governed’.  However, Bennett argues that there is little connection between the two: ‘nothing the Synod does has much effect on [the bishops], the administration of their diocese or the work of the leadership group within it’ (p.212).

This explains ‘the irritation which many bishops feel at having to spend so much time at Synod meetings, and their desultory contribution to its debates’ (p.212).  And who can blame the bishops for being bored by the General Synod, if its proceedings have so little relevance to their work?

Although Bennett does not make this point, English bishops differ from their Roman Catholic counterparts as well as their secular counterparts in their lack of accountability.  Canon 399(1) of the Code of Canon Law 1983 obliges every bishop ‘to present a report to the Supreme Pontiff every 5 years concerning the state of [his] diocese … according to a [standard] form … determined by the Apostolic See’.  This form may resemble the articles of enquiry on a visitation.

The bishop presents the report personally on his obligatory ad limina visit to Rome (canon 400(1)).  (Apparently, when the bishop appears before the Pope, a map of his diocese is hung up in the papal library, for the Holy Father’s ease of reference.)  The bishop receives ‘feedback’, not only from the Pope personally, but also from the various departments of the Roman Curia.

Perhaps if English bishops were required to report regularly, and individually, on their leadership of their dioceses to the General Synod (or the constituent convocations) episcopal leadership and synodical government might become more closely linked.  Episcopal interest in synodical proceedings would certainly revive!

Besides the General Synod there are the diocesan synods, but these also lack much constitutional equipment to scrutinise episcopal leadership.  The bishop is required ‘to consult with the diocesan synod on matters of general concern and importance’ (1969 Measure, s.4).  However, the synod can merely ‘advise the bishop on any matters on which he may consult the synod’.

The Archbishop has an ancient power to visit the bishops and dioceses of his province, to the end ‘that means may be taken thereby for the supply of such things as are lacking and the correction of such things as are amiss’ (canon G5(1)).  Archiepiscopal visitations have been held in recent years, but only to particular dioceses or churches, in order ‘to correct and supply the defects of other bishops’ (canon C17(1)).  In other words, an archiepiscopal visitation is not a regular, routine review but only occurs when something goes seriously wrong and the local bishop cannot cope.

Every diocesan bishop is now required to submit to a procedure known as ministerial development review, once every 2 years.  This review is organised by the Archbishop, who must also organise one for himself (Terms of Service Regulations 2009, reg 18(2)).  However, the General Synod is not involved in this, and the review’s conclusions are kept confidential.  The requirement was introduced to demonstrate the bishop’s equality (or ‘common tenure’ as it is called) with other ecclesiastical officeholders, who are also required to undergo ministerial development review, not his accountability to Church members.

(3)  The Crown Appointments Commission

After criticising inadequate consultation between the bishops and the synods, Bennett controversially proceeded to criticise the consultation process for the nomination of new bishops.

He complained of ‘a virtual exclusion of Anglo-Catholics from episcopal office and a serious under-representation of Evangelicals’ (p.221).  He also noted ‘the personal connection of so many appointed with the Archbishop of Canterbury himself’.

Dr Bennett was of the Anglo-Catholic party himself.  Moreover, despite a brilliant academic career (including a starred First from Cambridge), ecclesiastical preferment had eluded him.  He had to endure the agony of being passed over in favour of men of inferior ability, whose churchmanship was totally at variance with his own.  He was therefore vulnerable (as he would surely have realised) to the reproach that his criticism of episcopal appointments was, as Archbishop Habgood carefully explained, ‘an outburst from a disappointed cleric’ (p.83).

Bennett concluded that ‘An Archbishop should have an influence on appointments [but] it is clearly unacceptable that so many are the protégés of one man and reflect his own ecclesiastical outlook’ (p.222).  This was represented by Habgood, and the media, as an ‘attack’ on the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Archbishop Habgood justified his harsh words about the Preface by invoking the imperative of confidentiality.  ‘The [Crown Appointments] Commission can only do its work properly if its members feel free to discuss the lives and characters of [candidates] with total frankness, and if those who provide information can be similarly satisfied that nothing will be disclosed outside the actual meeting itself’ (p.84).

From this he concluded that a commentator who ‘claimed to write knowledgeably about the Commission … must either be abusing confidence … or … speculating on the basis of gossip’.  Either way, the Preface was dishonest.  The Archbishop concluded confidently ‘I believe [my criticism] is irrefutable’ (p.84).

It may not be.  Does confidentiality mean that knowledgeable, and fair, writing about the Commission is actually impossible?  Is the Commission’s work so confidential as to place it above and beyond all criticism?

Of course, the deliberations of the Crown Appointments Commission must be kept confidential, for the reasons identified by Archbishop Habgood.  However, the constitution, procedure and membership of the Commission are not, and should not be, confidential.  They are open to public comment and scrutiny.  And although the deliberations of the Commission are confidential, the outcome of those deliberations (i.e the appointments made as a result of them) is not.

It is not acceptable for a commentator to betray confidences, or make stuff up, and Dr Bennett did neither.  But it is acceptable to draw inferences from what is known of the constitution, procedure, membership (including the churchmanship and personalities of the members) and outcomes of the Commission.  Indeed any worthwhile commentary must draw such inferences, or it will add nothing to the known facts.  Dr Bennett did not betray confidences, nor did he lie.  He merely drew inferences from what was publicly known.

The Crown Appointments Commission is served by 2 appointments secretaries: ‘great power rests with the secretaries [because] they compile the list of candidates’ (p.219).  The Commission is chaired by the Archbishops, and ‘it is usually not difficult for a chairman to steer enough of [a committee’s] votes in the right direction’ (p.221).  The churchmanship of the Archbishops, and of the other Commission members, is known.  If no Anglo-Catholic bishops were appointed then the inference is that either no Anglo-Catholic candidates were shortlisted, or a majority of the Commission voted against them.

Of course, inferences can be mistaken.  Perhaps the bishops approved by the Commission were not mostly former colleagues and protégés of the Archbishop of Canterbury.  (That mistake, at least, should have been easy to correct.) Or perhaps they were simply the best men for the job, and their connection to the Archbishop and lack of Anglo-Catholicism a pure coincidence.  Or perhaps lots of Anglo-Catholics were offered bishoprics but turned them down.

Mistaken inferences may well be irritating to those in confidential possession of the true facts.  But they are not dishonest.  Archbishop Habgood’s criticism of ‘scurrilous charges’ was itself rather scurrilous.

A subsequent nomination of the Crown Appointments Commission suggests that there was some force in Bennett’s criticism.  And it was made when Archbishop Habgood was still in office, and still co-chairman of the Commission.  A candidate for one of the leading sees had a criminal conviction for indecency.  Yet this rather salient fact was not known to the representative members, who then approved the candidate’s nomination in ignorance of his past.  (Perhaps this could not happen nowadays, on account of the rigorous ‘safeguarding’ requirements.)

 

The Easter Offering: Duty and Charity

‘[At] the Offertory, so many as are disposed, shall offer unto the poor men’s box every one according to his ability and charitable mind.

And at the offering days appointed, every man and woman shall pay to the Curate [i.e the incumbent] the due and accustomed offerings.’  (Book of Common Prayer 1549, rubric)

There seem to be 2 widely held assumptions concerning the Easter offering, that:

(1) it is the collection taken at church services on Easter Day and

(2) the proceeds are part of the incumbent’s official income, at least if the incumbent wishes to claim them.

The 1549 rubric quoted above suggests that this assumption is mistaken.  The rubric indicates a clear distinction between the Easter offering and the normal offertory collection, including the collection taken on Easter Day.  The Easter offering is separate from, and additional to, the offertory collection.

Moreover, the two payments are different in character.  The offertory collection is a voluntary charitable donation for the relief of poverty.  The Easter Offering, by contrast, is a ‘due’ payment, not a gift determined by charitable disposition.  A due is a duty (just like a duty on imported goods).  The Easter Offering is a compulsory payment, a tax payable to the incumbent.

As the rubric implies, Easter was not the only ‘offering day’ in the middle ages.  Phillimore relates that there were originally 4 offering days in all, Christmas, Easter, Whitsun-Pentecost and the feast of the dedication of the parish church (Ecclesiastical Law, 2nd edition 1895, p.1243).

However, from 1552 onwards, Easter is the only offering day referred to in the Book of Common Prayer.  The revised rubric provides that

‘yearly at Easter, every parishioner shall reckon with his parson, vicar or curate … and pay to … him all ecclesiastical duties, accustomably due …’.  The word offering no longer appears.

This revised wording, of course, makes more explicit the compulsory nature of the payment, and its difference from the voluntary donation for the poor.

Phillimore suggests that the Easter duty was a common law right of all incumbents (p.1243).  Therefore an incumbent did not have to prove his right to payment.  An Easter offering was a larger payment than the common law duty, but it was payable only if the incumbent could prove an immemorial custom in the parish for payment of the offering (i.e a custom dating from 1189, very difficult to prove).

Victorian legislation permitted individual parishes ‘to enter into a parochial agreement for the commutation of Easter offerings’ (p.1244), i.e to cancel the parish offering in return for payment of a one off lump sum to the incumbent.

Although reference to Whitsun as an offering day was removed from the Prayer Book in 1552, Pentecostals (Whitsun offerings or duties) may have continued after that time.  The Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 provides that Pentecostals ‘shall cease to be exigible’ (demandable) (s.82(3)), but does not mention the Easter duty / offering.

The Easter duty / offering referred to in the Prayer Book has not been generally abolished, but it has been effectively destroyed by inflation.  The common law duty was a mere twopence a head (2d), so would now be impossible to enforce in practice.  An immemorial offering (if it can be proved) will only be worth a few pence more.  Common law and customary payments may not be adjusted for inflation (see the case of Bryant v Foot (1867) 2 Law Reports Queen’s Bench 161).

On our analysis, therefore, the incumbent’s only legal right is to the compulsory, though negligible, Easter duty.  He has no a priori common law right to keep the voluntary Easter collection for himself (any more than collections taken on other Sundays).  Even though it was removed from the rubric as long ago as 1552, the word ‘offering’, with its connotation of voluntary donation, has served to conflate the two payments artificially, encouraging a perception that they are one and the same.  However, they are clearly distinct in law.

The rubric concerning the offertory collection has changed since 1549.  It now provides that ‘the money given at the Offertory shall be disposed of to … pious and charitable uses’.  This, of course, allows a broader scope of use of the money than that available in 1549.  The money can now be applied to many uses other than the relief of poverty.  However, it is hard to argue from this that the incumbent’s personal benefit constitutes a ‘pious and charitable’ use.

The Parochial Church Councils (Powers) Measure 1956 empowers the parochial church council (‘the PCC’) ‘jointly with the minister to determine the objects to which all moneys to be given or collected in church shall be allocated’ (s.7(iv)).   If they cannot agree, the bishop decides instead (s.9(3)).

This power was originally expressed to be ‘subject to the directions contained in the Book of Common Prayer as to the disposal of money given at the offertory’.  The incumbent and PCC (and the bishop) therefore remained bound by the rubric.  They could decide how, exactly, the collection money was to be spent, but it still had to be spent on pious and charitable uses.

This restriction on the use of the collection money was removed in 1988, so the incumbent and PCC are no longer bound by the rubric at all.  However, it is arguable that, even in its amended form, the 1956 Measure does not confer an unfettered discretion on the incumbent and the PCC.  It suggests that the collection money must still be applied for the benefit of ‘objects’, i.e purposes or causes, rather than the benefit of particular people.

It has been pointed out that the rubric in the Book of Common Prayer applies only to the collection taken at Holy Communion.  The Prayer Book makes no provision for collections taken at Morning and Evening Prayer and other services.

In the case of Marson v Unmack (1923) Probate 163 the Court of the Arches suggested that ‘Collections … other than … the offertory, may lawfully be made for objects determined by agreement between the incumbent and the PCC.  Such objects may be and … ought to be announced to the congregation before collection …’ (p.169).  Again, the reference is to ‘objects’, and the Easter collection is not specifically discussed.

Apart from the wording of the 1956 Measure, it is arguably inconsistent with the incumbent’s trusteeship of the collection money for him to be able to determine that it should be paid to himself, even with the agreement of the PCC and the bishop, and even if the congregation is fully informed.  There is a clear conflict of interest.  A trustee may not profit from his trust.

If the incumbent’s claim on the voluntary Easter collection has no basis in common law it obviously requires a statutory basis.  It might therefore be appropriate to amend the 1956 Measure to provide this.

Moore’s Introduction to English Canon Law (3rd edition 1993) suggests that nowadays incumbents do not bother to claim the Easter collection, ‘since such offerings merely result in a pro tanto reduction in the [stipend] paid by the diocese’ (p.92).  Thus the stipend is simply reduced by the amount of the Easter collection money so the incumbent is no better off.

The Terms of Service Regulations 2009 confirm that an incumbent’s right to be paid the national minimum stipend is not absolute, but is subject to ‘any [other] income received by the office holder from other sources which is related to or derived from the duties of the office’ (reg 11.1).

Nevertheless the question of the Easter collection may still be relevant, even if incumbents no longer benefit personally.  A large sum of donated money is at stake.  If the incumbent makes a purported covenant or assignment of the Easter collection (to the diocese or elsewhere), this will be invalid if he is not entitled to the money in the first place.  (Nemo dat quod non habet).  Likewise, any decision on the allocation of the money, taken under the powers conferred by the 1956 Measure, may be flawed if it is influenced by the mistaken belief that the incumbent has a legal claim on it.

Ecclesiastical Preferment: Canon 33 and Martyn v Hind

Canon 33 of 1603, The Titles of such as are to be made Ministers, provided that

‘no person shall be admitted into sacred orders, except he shall …

[1] exhibit to the Bishop … a presentation of himself to some ecclesiastical preferment then void in that diocese; or shall

[2] bring to the said Bishop a … certificate that either he is provided of some church within the … diocese … or of some minister’s place vacant …’.

It goes on to warn that

‘if any Bishop shall [ordain] any person … that hath none of these titles … then he [the Bishop] shall keep and maintain him … till he do prefer him to some ecclesiastical living.  And if the said Bishop shall refuse to do so, he shall be suspended … from giving of Orders by the space of a year’.

Canon 33 was discussed in the case of Martyn v Hind (1776) 98 English Reports 1174.  The case sheds an interesting sidelight on the status of Church of England ministers.

Mr Martyn was a newly ordained curate.  He sued his rector (or former rector), Dr Hind, after the latter dismissed him.

When appointing Mr Martyn, the rector had stated that ‘I … promise to allow him a yearly sum of 50 guineas for his maintenance … until he shall be otherwise provided of some ecclesiastical preferment …’.  Mr Martyn was referred to in the third person because the statement was addressed to the Bishop, not to him.

Some time after his appointment as curate, Mr Martyn took on the office of ‘parish reader’, an appointment in the gift of the vestry that had nothing to do with the Bishop.  (Presumably he needed the extra money.)  The rector took the view that Mr Martyn was now ‘otherwise provided of some ecclesiastical preferment’, and that this in turn had the effect of releasing the rector from his promise of payment and entitling him to dismiss Mr Martyn.

When sued for the 50 guineas, the rector tried to argue that he had no liability to Mr Martyn, because the promise had been made only to the Bishop, to satisfy the requirements of Canon 33.

However, the court held that the rector’s statement ‘[was] not a contract with the Bishop to indemnify him: but a certificate and assurance to the Bishop of a matter of fact’, viz that Mr Martyn had a suitable job to go to (p.1177).  The instrument was ‘merely a matter of information to the Bishop: the contract [was] with the curate’ (p.1178).  As well as complying with the requirements of Canon 33 and the Bishop, the rector’s act of appointment also created a contract between himself and Mr Martyn.

The court held that Canon 33 ‘shows that … it is not barely necessary that [an ordination candidate] should have a maintenance [i.e an income]: but that he should likewise have … some church where he may exercise his ministerial function: for that is the ground upon which the Bishop is entitled to ordain’ (p.1177).

This suggests that the Bishop’s right to ordain a candidate is conditional on the candidate’s possession of a title, an ecclesiastical office.  If the candidate lacks a title, that will not invalidate the ordination, but Canon 33 effectively obliges the Bishop to obtain a title for the candidate himself.  (An ordained minister could not undertake secular employment.)

The same point also disposed of the rector’s next argument.  He claimed that Mr Martyn had never really been his curate at all, because, though ordained, he had not been licensed by the Bishop.

However, the court held that the ordination itself constituted a licence to officiate as curate.  Mr Martyn had not been ordained simpliciter.  On the contrary, the Bishop had ordained him to the particular curacy.  The office of curate was ‘the very foundation and title of the ordination: therefore he [Martyn] is licensed to all intents and purposes’ (p.1178).

Canon 33 was replaced by Canon C5 of the revised Canons.  Canon C5 does not repeat the threat of financial liability on a bishop who ordains without title.  However, it still requires that an ordination candidate ‘shall first exhibit to the bishop … a certificate that he is provided of some ecclesiastical office  … which the bishop shall judge sufficient’.

However, the new regime of ‘common tenure’ suggests that it is now the Bishop’s responsibility to certify the office, not the candidate’s.  The Terms of Service Regulations 2009 provide that an ecclesiastical office ‘may be designated as a training post if the office holder is required by the … bishop to undertake initial ministerial education’ (29(3)).  Like other officeholders one newly ordained is also entitled to a written statement of particulars of office (including remuneration) from a diocesan officer nominated by the Bishop (3(1)).  This may mean that an ordination candidate is ordained to the diocese more than to a particular office.

To return to Martyn v Hind.  The court doubted that Mr Martyn really was a parish reader: ‘The term reader has confounded us … [Mr Martyn] is not a reader in any sense of the law.  This is nothing more than a parish employing a clergyman … to read prayers, and they call him a reader’ (p.1178).

As the court observed, a reader (or lector) ‘is one of the 5 minor orders of the Roman Church, inferior to the deacon’.  It was therefore a lay office: ‘a reader known to the canon law is always put in opposition to a clergyman: they [readers] are always considered laymen’.  That was why the court doubted that Mr Martyn could be a reader, because he was an ordained clergyman.

The reader’s status was a matter of contemporary practice, as well as ‘foreign’ canon law.  The court noted that parishes would appoint lay readers where clergy were lacking.  For example, ‘in the Welch dioceses, where there is no endowment worth the while of a clergyman to accept … many persons officiate as readers ‘in opposition to clergymen”.

Whatever the precise nature of the parochial office bestowed on Mr Martin, it was not an ‘ecclesiastical preferment’.  This was because ‘the office [is] such as requires no licence or authority [from the Bishop].  Therefore … it is impossible to consider this as an ecclesiastical preferment’.  So the court awarded Mr Martyn his 50 guineas.

The court’s conclusion was therefore that the office of reader could not be an ecclesiastical office because

(1) it was an intrinsically lay office and

(2) it lacked episcopal authority.

Today a reader is still a lay officeholder (1).  The revised Canons are clear that only ‘a lay person’ can become a reader (cf Canon E4(1)).  An ordained minister is not eligible.  However, the office now requires episcopal authority just as much as that of an ordained minister (2).  It is no longer a parochial appointment but an episcopal one.

Thus a lay reader must be both (1) admitted to office and (2) licensed to officiate by the Bishop (Canons E5 and E6).  The Bishop may not licence a stipendiary reader unless satisfied that ‘adequate provision’ has been made for the reader’s maintenance (E6(4)).  A stipendiary reader also holds common tenure on the same terms as stipendiary clergy (Terms of Service Measure 2009, s.1(1)).

The English Parish

Phillimore’s Ecclesiastical Law records an ancient dictum that ‘A parish is the place in which the people belonging to one church dwell’ (2nd edition, 1895, quoted at p.1638).  On this view an ecclesiastical parish has three essential elements, a territory (the place), a community (the people) and place of worship (the church).  However, a place of worship will require an incumbent minister, who will in turn require to be appointed and maintained.  A community will also require some form of governance.

It is therefore argued that a parish has 9 constitutive elements.  This is an attempt to identify and describe them, but not to provide a comprehensive account of the law by which they are regulated.  (That would require an entire book.)

1.  Territory

Blackstone describes a parish as ‘that circuit of ground in which the souls under the care of one parson or vicar do inhabit’ (Commentaries vol 1, p.107).  The English parochial structure remains strongly territorial in character.  This territoriality is, of course, the basis of the Church of England’s proud claim to be a truly national Church, with ‘no inch of territory … no place … beyond the reach of the spiritual ministrations of a priest or place of worship’ (L Paul The Deployment and Payment of the Clergy (1964), p.23).

The area of a modern statutory parish will now usually be indicated on a map or plan annexed to the scheme by which it is constituted (Mission and Pastoral Measure 2011, s.52(2)).  Every new parish must be named by its constituting scheme (s.31(2)).

Parishes are subject to extra-parochial places, which are defined as universities, colleges, schools, hospitals and other public or charitable institutions (Extra-Parochial Places Ministry Measure 1967, s.2(1)).  As their name implies, such places are outwith the parochial structure, even if physically located within the territory of a parish.  However, a person who resides in an extra-parochial place is deemed to reside in the parish which it abuts, and hence to be a parishioner.  Any uncertainty on this point is determined by the bishop’s council of the diocese (Church Representation Rules 1(3)).  Any uncertainty about whether a particular area or place is, or is within, a parish or extra-parochial place is determined by the Church Commissioners after consultation with the bishop (s.105(2)).

Independent mission initiatives may also operate within parishes.  Mission initiatives first received legal recognition under the Dioceses, Pastoral and Mission Measure 2007.  They are now regulated by the 2011 Measure (ss.80-84).  A mission is constituted by order of the bishop.  The objective of the mission should be ‘fostering or developing a form of Christian community, to promote or further the mission of the Church, or any aspect of it’.

If an ecclesiastical parish is understood as a territory, it follows that ‘parishioners’ may include persons who are not members of the Church of England.  Roman Catholics, Methodists and Muslims are obviously not members of the Church of England but they are still all parishioners, because they all live within the territory of a parish.

2.  Community

While English law defines the parish as a territory, Roman Catholic law defines it as a corporation.  According to the Code of Canon Law 1983, a parish is ‘a definite community of the Christian faithful’ (canon 515.1).  Thus, in contrast with English law, persons who are not members of the Church cannot be parishioners.  A commentary suggests that the word ‘parish’ is derived from a Greek word that originally meant ‘a pilgrim people’ (in contrast to the English idea of a settled community), and that ‘however important territorial factors are in parish organisation, what is really constitutive of the parish is its being a community of persons’ (The Code of Canon Law. A Text and Commentary eds Coriden, Green and Heintschel 1985, Paulist Press, New York, p.416).

Despite its corporate character a Roman Catholic parish ‘as a general rule is to be territorial’ (canon 518).  However, personal parishes may be established if this is ‘useful’ (canon 518).  Thus Eastern rite Catholics within the jurisdiction of a Latin rite bishop may be constituted as a personal parish.  The Anglican Ordinariates comprise personal parishes of former members of the Anglican Communion.

As the churchgoing population has become more mobile, modern English law has extended the definition of a parishioner to include persons who worship regularly in the parish church but who do not live within the parish.  A non-resident lay communicant is entitled to have his name entered on the electoral roll of the parish if he has worshipped regularly in the parish church during the previous 6 months (Church Representation Rules 1(2) and (4)).  He also has the same right as a resident parishioner to marry in the parish church (Marriage Act 1949, s.72(2)).  The Marriage Measure 2008, as amended in 2012, extended the right to marry in the parish church to persons who can show a personal or familial connection with the parish or the church.

3.  Church

If a building is not already a parish church it cannot be legally constituted as such until

(1) the Commissioners approve it as ‘suitable’, and

(2) it is consecrated (Mission and Pastoral Measure 2011, s.41(2)).

‘Suitable’ is not defined further.  Canon law suggests that only a permanent place of worship should be consecrated.  The original Roman Catholic Code of 1917 forbade consecration ‘if it can be reasonably foreseen that a church will be turned to profane uses’.  Churches made of wood or iron were not supposed to be consecrated on account of their impermanent character (canons 1165, now abolished).

A parish has no right to a parish church.  Thus a new parish may be created even if it has no parish church (2011 Measure, s.31(4)).  A scheme may also provide that an existing parish church shall cease to be constituted as such (s.41(1)).  If there is already a church in the area of a newly-created parish, this may, but need not, be designated as the parish church.

However, a parish with no parish church must still have some place of worship.  If a parish has no church the bishop must licence a building, or part of a building, within the parish for public worship (s.43(1)).  Thus the bishop consecrates a permanent place of worship but licences a temporary one.  This rule seems to echo the canon law.

A licensed place of worship may also be designated the parish centre of worship (PCW).  Thus a building which is not a church requires to be both

(1) licensed for public worship by the bishop and

(2) appropriately designated by him

in order to become a PCW.  The designation of a PCW must be under seal (s.43(6)).

Although the bishop is obliged to licence a place of public worship he is not expressly obliged to designate a PCW.  S.43(3) suggests that a bishop may designate a PCW even if there is already a parish church.

4.  Benefice

While upholding the fixed territorial character of parishes, modern ecclesiastical law permits considerable flexibility of parochial ministry.  A single incumbent may have pastoral responsibility for more than one parish.  Contrariwise, a single parish may be under the pastoral care of more than one incumbent.

The former arrangement may be effected in one of two ways:

(1) the single incumbent may hold two or more benefices in plurality (2011 Measure, s.32)

(2) the benefices themselves may be united or merged into a single united benefice (s.31).  A distinction is therefore drawn between a parish and the area of a benefice.  Several parishes may share the same benefice.

A plurality is obviously a looser arrangement than a united benefice.  The bishop may permit the incumbent of a plurality to resign one or some benefices but not all of them (s.32(4)).  Also, on a vacancy in the benefices, the plurality may be terminated at the instance either of the bishop or one of the parochial church councils (s.32(2)).  A united benefice may not be dissolved in such circumstances, unless its constitution provides for this.

The latter pastoral arrangement may also be effected in one of two ways:

(1) In a group ministry, each incumbent is required to assist the other incumbents in the group ‘so as to make the best possible provision for the cure of souls throughout the area of the group’ (s.35(1)).

(2) A team ministry is a more radical departure from traditional parochial ministry.  It is a sharing of the cure of souls by two or more clergy within the area of one benefice (s.34(1)).  A team ministry comprises a team rector and one or more team vicars.  In a traditional parish a rector and vicar never work side by side.  Teams vicars are quasi-incumbents, though their offices are licensed, not beneficed (s.34(4).  A team vicar, or other member of the ‘team’, may be assigned a special cure of souls of part of the area of a benefice or a particular ‘pastoral function’ within the team ministry (s.34(8)).

Group ministry and team ministry are not mutually exclusive.  A group ministry may include a benefice which is constituted as a team ministry (s.35(6)).

If a benefice is vacant for a long time, a licensed priest-in-charge acts in place of the incumbent.

5.  Patronage

A right of presentation to a benefice, or advowson, was originally a right of property, a so-called ‘incorporeal hereditament’ similar to a right of way.  However, as a result of the Patronage (Benefices) Measure 1986, most advowsons have been severed from land (s.32).  Now they are merely the personal right of the patron.  Only rights of presentation attaching to benefices and bishoprics retain a connection to land.  Thus if an incumbent is ex officio the patron of another benefice, the right of patronage continues to be part of the incumbent’s benefice property.

The patronage of a statutory benefice or plurality should be provided in its constitution (2011 Measure, s.46(2)).  If the constitution is silent the right of presentation vests in the diocesan patronage board (s.46(3)).  The patronage of a team rectory and the appointment of a team vicar are regulated by schedule 3 of the 2011 Measure.

A patron’s title is now proved by registration on a diocesan register (1986 Measure, s.1).

The patron’s exercise of a right of presentation (as distinct from his ownership of it) may be suspended under s.88 of the 2011 Measure.  Hence the need for a priest-in-charge.

6.  Endowment

The mediaeval canon law discussed in the preceding post suggests that the parish church and the supporting endowment were originally inseparable, and that together they formed the basis of the ecclesiastical parish.  Blackstone held that the boundaries of a parish were originally determined by the appropriation of tithes to a particular church and incumbent (Commentaries, vol 1, p.109).  From the middle ages until relatively recently, incumbents resembled self-employed farmers, men of property who lived off the rents and profits of their glebe land, and, of course, tithes.

The case of Greenslade v Darby (1868) 37 Law Journal 137 suggests that the churchyard may be a kind of hybrid of church and glebe.  Like the church it fulfills a religious and parochial purpose but, like glebe, it is also a source of profit from cultivation.  The rector (who in that case was a lay rector, not an incumbent) therefore has the right to use the churchyard land for profit, albeit only to the extent that this use is not ‘unseemly or inconsistent with [the land] being consecrated’ (p.143).

Tithes were originally payable in kind (wood, grain, cattle, sheep, poultry etc).  Later, they took the form of a payment of money called the tithe rentcharge or corn rent.  The Tithe Act 1836 commuted almost all tithes into rentcharges.  Tithe rentcharge was finally abolished a century later by the Tithe Act 1936.

The Endowments and Glebe Measure 1976 finally severed the ancient connection between parish church and endowment.  Under s.15 of the Measure, all benefice glebe that had hitherto vested in the incumbent was transferred to the diocesan board of finance (s.15), and so became part of the diocesan glebe instead (s.45(1).  Modern incumbents therefore resemble salaried employees rather than gentleman farmers.  The diocesan board of finance is now responsible for the payment of clergy stipends (Miscellaneous Provisions Measure 2000, s.1(1)).  There is a national minimum stipend fixed by the Archbishops’ Council (Terms of Service Regulations 2009, reg 11(1)).  Pensions are also administered nationally by the Church of England Pensions Board.

7.  Parsonage

Although he is no longer master of glebe and tithe, the incumbent remains the nominal freeholder of the parsonage (the official residence of the benefice) even if his occupation of it now resembles that of a tenant or licensee of the Church.

The Parsonages Measure 1938, extensively amended by more recent Measures, and the Repair of Benefice Buildings Measure 1972 are the two principal statutes regulating parsonages.

Much of the 1972 Measure resembles a kind of statutory lease, stating the respective rights and duties of the Church and the incumbent towards the parsonage.  It regulates the incumbent’s occupation of the parsonage.  The 1938 Measure, by contrast, regulates dealings with parsonages between the Church and outside third parties.  It is principally concerned with the sale of old parsonages and the purchase of new ones.  Thus, while much of the 1972 Measure resembles a lease, the Parsonages Measure resembles a conveyancing contract and protocol.

Although the incumbent is freeholder, the Endowments and Glebe Measure 1976 confers a power of compulsory acquisition of the parsonage from him, if the Church considers that it is no longer necessary for his ‘convenient occupation’ of the incumbent (s.32).

A house that is built or purchased for use as a parsonage must be certified as such by the bishop (Parsonages Measure 1938, s.11).  The constitution of a benefice may, but need not, designate the official residence of the incumbent, or of a team vicar (Measure and Pastoral Measure 2011, s.45(1)).

An incumbent has no a priori right to a parsonage house, just as a parish has no right to a parish church.  However, under the new regime of ‘common tenure’ introduced by the Ecclesiastical Offices (Terms of Service) Measure 2009, other full-time stipendiary clergy and lay ministers are entitled to accommodation ‘for the better performance of [their] duties’ (s.4(1)).  A priest-in-charge of a vacant benefice will usually live in the parsonage (cf. 2011 Measure, s.86(4)).

8.  Churchwardens

The normal rule is two churchwardens to a parish, but the Churchwardens Measure 2001 permits a different number of churchwardens on the basis of local custom or special statutory authority (s.11).  Moreover, if a single parish has more than one parish church, or has a parish church and a PCW, there must be two churchwardens for each church or PCW (s.1).

If there is a team ministry for a parish containing more than one church or place of worship, the constituting scheme may allow for deputy churchwardens for each, and for the functions of churchwardens to be delegated to them (Mission and Pastoral Measure 2011, schedule 4.3(2)(d)).

9.  Parochial Church Council

Every parish must have a parochial church council (‘PCC’).  The constitution of the PCC is provided in the Church Representation Rules.  The PCC must include a certain number of lay members elected at the annual parish meeting by those enrolled on the electoral roll of the parish.

The Church Representation Rules permit parishioners to make certain variations to the structure of parochial administration.  Such variations may also be authorised under the Measure and Pastoral Measure 2011, but on a temporary, experimental basis only.  There are five particular variations:

(1) If a parish has more than one place of worship, the PCC may be specially structured ‘in such manner as to ensure due representation of the congregation of each church or place [of worship]’ (rule 18).  Thus each congregation will be separately represented on the PCC.

(2) More radically, a separate district church council (‘DCC’) may be constituted for the district of the parish in which a church or place of worship is situated.  A DCC need not be constituted for every district in the parish containing a place of worship, and it is possible to have both a specially structured PCC and one or more DCCs at the same time.

Variations (1) and (2) apply to a parish with more than one place of worship.  The other three variations depend on the benefice rather than the place of worship:

(3) There may be a joint PCC where two or more parishes share a single benefice or where benefices are held in plurality (rule 19).

(4) A team council may be established where two or more parishes are served by the same team ministry (rule 20).

(5) A group council may be established for the parishes served by a group ministry (rule 21).

However, notwithstanding these variations, each individual parish retains its own PCC at all times.

Designated Offices and Common Tenure

Although equal security of tenure for all beneficed and licensed clergy is the general rule under the Ecclesiastical Offices (Terms of Service) Measure 2009, there are exceptions.  S.2(2) of the Measure makes clear that ‘common tenure’ is not incompatible with ‘appointments of limited duration’.

The only such appointment which is specifically referred to in the 2009 Measure concerns that of a priest-in-charge during a vacancy in the benefice.  The licence of a priest-in-charge may be revoked when the vacancy comes to an end (s.3(4)).  However, the Measure also provides that the bishop may revoke a licence granted to a person ‘in connection with employment under a contract of employment’ (e.g a school or hospital chaplain), if the contract is terminated by the employer (s.3(5)).

The Regulations issued under the 2009 Measure provide further categories of appointments of limited duration.  These are stated at Regulation 29.  Such appointments may be either

(1) for a fixed term (which may, however, be extended for a further period or periods indefinitely) or

(2) terminable on the occurrence of a specified event.

Some temporary appointments are fairly obvious.  They include

(1)  a post created to cover a colleague’s authorised absence from work

(2)  a post created as part of a mission initiative (mission initiatives are temporary in nature) and

(3)  a licence granted to an office holder who is above the retirement age of 70.

 However, Regulation 29 also provides for 3 categories of ‘designated office’ that are of limited duration:

(1)  Training posts.  These may arise where the office holder (e.g a recently ordained curate) is required by the bishop to undertake initial ministerial education.

(2)  Posts subject to sponsorship funding.  Such a post may arise where any part of the office holder’s remuneration ‘package’ (i.e stipend, pension, accommodation, expenses) is funded or supplied from outside the official Church (‘defrayed by a person or body other than a diocesan board of finance, parsonages board, parochial church council or the [Church] Commissioners’ (29(4)).  The post might need to be terminated for financial reasons if the sponsor withdrew support.

(3)  Probationary offices.  These may arise

(a)  where the office holder is returning to the Church after a career break (‘has not held any ecclesiastical office in any place during the [preceding] 12 months’ 29(5)) or

(b) where the office holder has a bad disciplinary record under the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 or the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003, or was removed from his previous office under the capability procedure introduced by the 2009 Measure (29(6) and (7)).

Training and sponsorship posts (1) and (2) can only be licensed offices, not benefices.  Also, the office of team vicar may not be designated as a sponsorship post.  However, it would be possible, on the wording of Regulation 29, for a benefice to be designated as a probationary office. 

Regulation 29 is silent as to any procedure for the designation of offices.  It does not specify who does the designating, or how, or when.  Moreover, it provides only that offices ‘may’, not must, be designated as such.  This suggests that a particular office need not be designated as a training, sponsored or probationary office, even if it matches the description of one.

Although Regulation 29 is vague, it must be clear from its context that an office can only be designated by the bishop, or at least with his agreement.  The bishop confers title to the office, whether beneficed or licensed.  If an appointment is to be of limited duration, this fact must be recorded on the ‘statement of initial particulars of office’ to which the new office holder is entitled (reg 3(5)(j)).  The statement must be prepared by a diocesan officer nominated by the bishop (3(1)(a)).

The initial statement must be given to the office holder not later than one month after he takes up the office.  The Terms of Service Regulations also envisage that particulars of office may change after the office holder has been appointed.  In that case, the office holder is entitled to another statement ‘containing particulars of the change’ (Reg 6(1)).

It may be very unlikely in practice, but the vagueness of Regulation 29 suggests the possibility of a misunderstanding over the designation of a particular office.  The office holder might accept an office before realising that it is designated and therefore of limited duration.  The bishop might change his mind and designate an office after the office holder has been appointed, thereby reducing the office holder’s tenure.

A disappointed office holder could then have recourse to the diocesan grievance procedure required by the Terms of Service Regulations (reg 32), but this may not be a very attractive option as the grievance procedure is controlled by the bishop.

Clerical Capability

The Ecclesiastical Offices (Terms of Service) Measure 2009 suggests 3 procedures for removing clergy on account of their unfitness for office:

(1) the prosecution of ‘reserved’ offences against doctrine, ritual and ceremonial, under the unrepealed provisions of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963

(2) proceedings under the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 and

(3) the capability procedure, or procedures, provided under the 2009 Measure itself (s.3(3) and (6)).

The capability procedures are described as ‘procedures to assess the performance of office holders, including remedies for inadequate performance’ (s.2(2)(d)).  Under the Terms of Service Regulations 2009, capability procedure takes the form of ‘an inquiry into the capability of an office holder to perform the duties of his or her office’ (reg 31(1)).  The bishop may instigate an inquiry ‘if he considers that the performance of an office holder affords grounds for concern’.  Any inquiry must be conducted in accordance with a statutory Code of Practice (reg 31(3)).

The 2009 Measure does not completely abolish the old class distinction between beneficed and licensed clergy.  However, it seeks to provide that, once they are beneficed or licensed, all clergy will enjoy the same security of tenure and be subject to the same professional discipline.  This point is made by describing the terms of service under which beneficed and licensed clergy hold office as ‘common tenure’ (s.1(3)).

However, it has been argued elsewhere in this blog that ‘common tenure’ is endangered by the confused relationship between the Clergy Discipline Measure and the capability procedure, i.e procedures (2) and (3) above (see posts filed below under this category).

The statutory Codes of Practice concerning the 2003 Measure and the capability procedure are not reassuring on this point.  The Clergy Discipline Code suggests, ominously, that the boundary between discipline and capability procedure

‘will need to be determined on a case by case basis.  It is in the interests of justice for there to be flexibility between the capability procedure under the [Terms of Service] Regulations and disciplinary proceedings under the [2003] Measure, so that cases are dealt with in the most appropriate way’.  (paras 259-60, emphasis supplied).

It is argued that this view is mistaken.  On the contrary, ‘the interests of justice’ demand consistency and certainty.  Clergy discipline, like all professional discipline, is a penal, quasi-criminal jurisdiction which exists to maintain professional standards and public confidence.  This demands that everyone, both the subjects of the jurisdiction and the public, should know what to expect and that the subjects of the jurisdiction should be treated the same.

The Clergy Discipline Code suggests that it is for the bishop to decide whether a complaint should be pursued under the 2003 Measure or under the capability procedure (para 261).  The Capability Code provides that the person appointed by the bishop to oversee a particular case (usually the archdeacon) may suspend a capability inquiry if he decides that the matter should be dealt with under the 2003 Measure or the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 (para 22.1).

Neither Code provides for the accused clergyman to have a say in the matter.  The only protection afforded to him is that both Codes agree that he should not be subject to disciplinary proceedings and capability inquiry at the same time.

The danger is that the ‘flexibility’, or rather, the arbitrary ‘case by case’ approach which results from the uncertain boundary between the Clergy Discipline Measure and the Terms of Service Measure will undermine the common professional discipline that was the raison d’etre of both Measures.  Different clergy will be treated differently in respect of the same alleged misconduct.  Worse, accused clergy will only be able to defend themselves in the ecclesiastical courts if their bishops and archdeacons permit them to do so.  The uncertain boundary may cause the capability jurisdiction to become larger and larger as that of the ecclesiastical courts becomes smaller and smaller. 

What is the correct purpose of the capability procedure, if it is not to trespass on proceedings under the Clergy Discipline Measure?  One obvious use for a capability procedure is to assess an office holder’s medical fitness.  It is not misconduct to be in poor health.  The Terms of Service Regulations expressly provide for a medical capability procedure (cf reg 28).  Another use of the capability procedure is to address pastoral difficulties between an office holder and his parishioners.

In the case of Bland v Archdeacon of Cheltenham (1972) 1 All England Reports 1012 the Court of the Arches firmly held that disciplinary proceedings cannot be used to resolve a difficult pastoral situation by removing an incumbent who has alienated his parishioners but cannot be got rid of by other means.  In the wake of that case, the Incumbents (Vacation of Benefices) Measure 1977 was passed. 

The 1977 Measure introduced a procedure whereby incumbents and team vicars could be removed from office or subject to special restrictions, if it was found on inquiry that their conduct had contributed over a substantial period of time to a serious breakdown in pastoral relations.  ‘Serious breakdown’ was defined as a situation which impedes the promotion of the Church’s mission in the parish (s.19A).

Unfortunately the inquiry procedure provided by the 1977 Measure was so lengthy and expensive that it was hardly ever used.  The case of Cheesman v Church Commissioners (1999) Privy Council 12 records that the Bishop in the case was forced to abandon proceedings against the Rev Mr Cheesman on account of their sheer length and expense (p.20).  The Bishop complained bitterly that the 1977 Measure was ‘a deeply flawed piece of legislation’ (quoted at p.22).  The Privy Council itself acknowledged that ‘It is [the Measure’s] structure which makes the implementation of the 1977 proceedings so cumbersome and uncertain in outcome’ (p.6).

As mentioned, the 1977 Measure applied only to incumbents and team vicars.  This was long before common tenure was introduced.  Licensed clergy who fell out with their parishioners would simply have their licences terminated.

However, s.11(6) of the Terms of Service Measure provides that the 1977 Measure does not apply to any clergy who are subject to common tenure.  This means that the 1977 Measure will soon become obsolete (to the extent that it is not already!) as all clergy will eventually be subject to common tenure. 

The effective repeal of the 1977 Measure under s.11(6), and the decision in Bland, imply that pastoral breakdown will in future be addressed by the capability procedure.

This may have implications for clergy who take advantage of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 to enter into homosexual ‘marriages’.  We have argued elsewhere that such clergy are safe from the ecclesiastical courts as the law now stands.  However, they may not be so safe from the capability procedure.  It is arguable that the procedure could be used to remove them from office if inquiry were to show, at least to the satisfaction of the Church authorities, that their status had caused pastoral difficulties.