Read v Bishop of Lincoln (1890)
Edward King (1829-1910) is now commemorated in the Church of England’s liturgical Calendar (the nearest Anglican equivalent of canonisation), and by an impressive statue in Lincoln Cathedral, where he officiated as Bishop. He was revered for his holiness, learning and pastoral zeal. The Dictionary of National Biography suggests that he was the first Anglican bishop to wear a mitre.
However, Bishop King’s Anglo-Catholic ritualism was not to everyone’s taste. The Church Association, a Low Church pressure group represented by Mr Read, complained about it to the Archbishop of Canterbury.
The complaints about the Bishop’s ritualism were similar to those made against the Rev Alexander Heriot Mackonochie (1825-1887), Vicar of St. Albans Church, Holborn, who also fell foul of the Church Association, represented this time by Mr Martin. Mackonochie was prosecuted twice in the Court of the Arches.
Sir Robert Phillimore, Dean of the Arches (and original author of the famous commentary on ecclesiastical law), tried both the Mackonochie cases. He upheld some of the complaints against Mr Mackonochie, but dismissed others. However, the Church Association appealed to the Privy Council, which overruled Sir Robert and upheld the complaints that he had dismissed.
Mr Mackonochie was prosecuted under the Church Discipline Act 1840. He was a mere vicar. There was then no statutory procedure for the trial of a bishop. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Edward White Benson, decided to try the case against Bishop King personally, under a common law procedure formally described as ‘the Court of the Archbishop’ (or, less formally, ‘the Archbishop in his library’).
In Bishop of St David’s Case (1699) 91 English Reports 126, the secular court accepted that ‘By the common law, the Archbishop has a metropolitical jurisdiction … Archbishops are over bishops, as well as bishops are over the other clergy’ (p.127). Accordingly ‘the Archbishop hath a provincial power over all bishops of his province and may hold his court where he will, either at the Arches or elsewhere. He may likewise convene the [accused] party before himself and judge himself …’ (p.711). This was the authority for the Lincoln Judgment.
The Lincoln Judgment resembles Phillimore’s judgment in Martin v Mackonochie (No.1) (1868) Law Reports 2 Admiralty and Ecclesiastical 116. Both are very long: Sir Robert’s runs to 130 pages, the Archbishop’s to a mere 89 pages. They are long for the same reason: copious citation and discussion of theological and historical materials. The Privy Council later observed that the Archbishop ‘consulted ancient authors, historical and theological works, pictures, engravings and a variety of documents … (1892) Appeal Cases 644, at p.652. All this erudition is impressive, but it also makes the judgments arduous to read.
The complaints against Mr Mackonochie and the Bishop of Lincoln mostly alleged the performance of illegal ceremonies. The Archbishop defined a ceremony as ‘a formal symbolic gesture of religious meaning publicly made by the Minister in his character of Minister, rendering the delivery of language more solemn, and not merely expressing his private devotion’ (p.81). Thus a ceremony is a public act, to be distinguished from a private devotional act. A ceremony is an action. It must therefore be distinguished from a rite (which is a form of words) and from an ornament (a physical item).
The Bishop was charged with the following offences
(1) Mixing Water with Wine
(2) Administering the Mixed Chalice
1549 rubric: ‘the minister … putting the Wine into the Chalice … [and] putting thereto a little pure and clean water’
1552 and 1558 rubrics: no equivalent
1662 rubric: ‘the priest shall … place upon the Table so much Bread and Wine, as he shall think sufficient’. (No reference to water).
The Archbishop concluded that the removal of the 1549 rubric from the 1552 Prayer Book meant that the ceremony of mixing water with wine must be discontinued.
However, he concluded from a review of the historical evidence that
(1) mixing before the Communion Service had begun was the practice of the Early Church and
(2) the reformers were aware of this, and sought to replicate the practice.
Therefore mixing before the service was not an illegal ceremony, but a permitted practice.
1662 rubric: ‘if any [Bread and Wine] remain … which was consecrated … the Priest and such other of the Communicants as he shall call unto him, shall, immediately after the Blessing, reverently eat and drink the same’.
This rubric clearly contemplates that the consumption of leftovers may be done in public, as it provides that
(1) the priest may consume together with other communicants, not alone, and
(2) consumption shall take place immediately, without delay, therefore at a time when the congregation will still be present.
The Bishop’s action complied with the rubric and was not an illegal ceremony.
(4) Eastward Position
1549 rubric: ‘The Priest standing humbly before the middle of the Altar’
1552 rubric: ‘The Table … shall stand in the body of the Church, or in the Chancel … the Priest standing at the north side of the Table’. (‘Table’, not ‘Altar’ any more.)
1558 and 1662 rubrics: ditto.
1662 rubric: on the Offertory ‘the Priest … shall humbly present and place it upon the Holy Table’.
The rubrics only refer to the Eastward and Northward positions in relation to the opening prayers in the Communion Service. They are silent as to the correct position during the Consecration. The Archbishop pointed out that the Offertory Rubric necessarily requires the priest to face east.
The Archbishop denied that the Eastward position ‘conveys some sacrificial doctrine of the Eucharist against the doctrine of the English Church’. He observed that the Tractarians ‘habitually celebrated at the North End, and many who have used the Eastward position have done so with no thought that they were teaching any doctrine by it …’ (p.43).
He concluded that ‘The imputed sacrificial aspect of the Eastward position is new and forced, and can take no effect in rendering that position either desirable … or illegal’ (pp43-44). It was therefore permitted.
(5) Not Breaking the Bread ‘before the People’
1662 rubric: ‘the Priest, standing before the Table, [should have] so ordered the Bread and Wine, that he may … break the Bread before the People’.
Breaking the Bread is one of the 5 Manual Acts
(1) Taking the Paten
(2) Breaking the Bread
(3) Touching the Bread
(4) Taking the Cup
(5) Touching the Cup and any other vessel containing Wine.
This rubric is difficult to reconcile with the Archbishop’s conclusion on the Eastward position. ‘The Minister, wherever he stands during the Prayer of Consecration, is bound to take care that the Manual Acts should not by his position be rendered invisible to the bulk of the Communicants’ (p.49).
As the Bishop was in the Eastward position during the Prayer of Consecration, the congregation could not see him breaking the Bread. This contravened the Rubric.
Moreover, as the Archbishop himself acknowledged, ‘the tenor of the Common Prayer is openness … and specially to replace [i.e reinstate] the Eucharist in its [original] character as the communion of the whole Body of Christ’ (p.50).
(6) Reciting the Agnus Dei
The Agnus Dei is a prayer or hymn, therefore a rite, not a ceremony. It appeared in the original Book of Common Prayer 1549, but was omitted thereafter. The reason for this omission was ‘because it was associated with the Mass and the adoration of the Host’, but not because of any doctrinal objection. On the contrary, the 2 clauses which compose the Agnus Dei are ‘taken out of the Bible’ (p.60). They also appear in the Gloria In Excelsis, which was never omitted from the Prayer Book.
The Archbishop pointed out that it had never been considered illegal to sing a hymn or anthem during the Communion Service, even where this is not expressly prescribed. The Act of Uniformity 1548 also provided that ‘it shall be lawful … to use openly any psalms or prayer taken out of the Bible at any due time’.
Recitation of the Agnus Dei was therefore not unlawful. This conclusion actually contradicted that of Phillimore, who had held that it was unlawful: Martin v Mackonochie (No.2) (1874) Law Reports 4 Admiralty and Ecclesiastical 279. However, his son and editor, Sir Walter Phillimore, conceded that ‘this question was argued more thoroughly [in the Lincoln case] than it had been previously’ (Ecclesiastical Law, 2nd ed 1895, p.776). The Archbishop’s reasoning is indeed compelling on this point.
(7) Lighted candles on the Communion Table ‘as a matter of ceremony and when … not wanted for the purpose of giving light’.
Lighted candles were clearly lawful before the Reformation (p.66). Were they outlawed at the Reformation?
There is no specific rubrical reference to candles, but candles are clearly ‘ornaments of the church’, and therefore governed by the Ornaments Rubric. In Mackonochie (No.1), however, Phillimore considered that the use of lighted candles was a ceremony, and the Privy Council was ‘disposed to agree’: (1868) Law Reports 2 Privy Council 365, at p.385. It pointed out that ‘There is a clear and obvious distinction between
 the presence in the church of things inert and unused and
 the active use of the same things as a part of … a ceremony’.
However, the Archbishop dealt with the lighted candles as ornaments, not ceremony. He held that ‘it does not appear that [the Ornaments Rubric] … altered the legality of the 2 lights … if it was legal up to this time that they should so stand’ (p.71).
The conclusion that lighted candles were not illegal (whether qua ornament or qua ceremony) flatly contradicted the Privy Council’s decision in Martin v Mackonochie (No.1), though it agreed with Phillimore’s decision which the Privy Council had overruled.
Mr Read did not neglect to inform the Privy Council of the Archbishop’s apparent disregard of its authority. The Privy Council admitted that ‘If the proof [i.e evidence] corresponded with the allegation [against the Bishop] … it would be a matter for grave consideration how far the Archbishop’s elaborate exposition of the history of the question … [has] afforded new materials for consideration since the decision of this Board in Martin v Mackonochie upon the same subject’ (pp.666-7).
However, nearly a quarter of a century had passed between the first prosecution of Mr Mackonochie and the Lincoln Judgment. Judicial attitudes to ritualism were evidently more relaxed by then. The Privy Council was obviously unwilling to overrule the Archbishop. It therefore identified an ingenious distinction between the facts of the 2 cases.
The true issue in both cases was not whether lighted candles were lawful or unlawful, but whether Mr Mackonochie or the Bishop had acted illegally. Mr Mackonochie had acted illegally, because he was a vicar and officiating in his own church when the candles were lit. They must have been lit either by him personally or by someone else at his direction.
The Bishop, by contrast, had not acted illegally, because he had not lit the candles, nor caused them to be lit. (At least, there was no evidence that he had.) The candles were the responsibility of the vicar of the church where the Bishop was officiating. The Bishop may have approved of the lighted candles but approval per se did not amount to an ecclesiastical offence. Any criminality in respect of the candles attached to the vicar, not the Bishop, and the vicar was not on trial.
(This distinction might be persuasive if the bishop had been officiating outside his diocese, as a visitor or guest. As it was, however, the Bishop was officiating in his own diocese, and therefore in a place where he had the chief cure of souls, and was the vicar’s canonical superior. In these circumstances, it could well be argued that the Bishop was ultimately responsible for the candles.)
It was therefore on the basis of this dubious and hairsplitting technicality that the Lincoln Judgment was allowed to stand, notwithstanding the Privy Council’s contrary conclusion in Mackonochie. The Privy Council did not actually accept the Archbishop’s conclusion on candles, and did not repent of its earlier decision. It merely agreed with the Archbishop that the Bishop had not acted illegally, but for different reasons.
(8) Sign of the Cross in Absolution
The Prayer Book refers only to the Sign of the Cross in baptism, not elsewhere. It was argued for the Bishop that ‘omission of a direction is not a prohibition’ (p.82). The Archbishop considered that the ceremony could only be lawful if it had been practised in the mediaeval Church. The Prayer Book could not be expected to prohibit a practice that was then unknown.
Having reviewed the mediaeval English liturgies, the Archbishop found that ‘there is no direction for even … private crossing of himself by the priest’ (p.83).
If it was not a revived mediaeval practice, the Sign of the Cross in Absolution must be ‘An observance … borrowed and introduced from foreign [i.e popish] usages’ after the Prayer Book was written (p.83). Thus it could not be treated as a practice omitted, or tacitly approved, by the rubrics. On the contrary, it was ‘an innovation which must be discontinued’ (p.84).
(9) Sign of the Cross in Benediction
1549 rubric: ‘the Priest turning him to the people, shall let them depart with this Blessing’
1552 rubric: ‘the Priest or the Bishop, if he be present, shall let them depart with this Blessing’
In the mediaeval Mass, apparently, there was no final blessing by the priest, merely a dismissal of the faithful with such words as Ite, Missa Est or Benedicamus Domino. A blessing was pronounced only by the bishop, if he were present. This special episcopal blessing did not involve the Sign of the Cross, merely the lifting up of the hand (p.85).
The closing blessing in the Prayer Book could not therefore be a continuation or revival of a mediaeval ceremony (p.87). The Prayer Book blessing did not provide for or permit the Sign of the Cross, any more than the Absolution.
The conclusions reached by the Lincoln Judgment are generally persuasive, with the exception of (4), concerning the Eastward Position. However, the Judgment can be criticised to the extent that it
(1) relied too much on extraneous material that was either irrelevant or of marginal relevance and
(2) paid insufficient regard to the Book of Common Prayer, which was the true source of authority for its conclusions.
Conclusion (8) best illustrates the confusion of erudition and authority. The Archbishop held that the Sign of the Cross in Absolution was illegal because it was a modern, post-Reformation ceremony, and not a mediaeval ceremony. If it had been a mediaeval ceremony, it would have been lawful.
Yet the Preface to the Book of Common Prayer ‘Concerning Ceremonies’ is unequivocally subtitled ‘Why some be abolished, and some retained’. The dichotomy is clear. A ceremony is either abolished, or it is retained. All ceremonies not retained in the Prayer Book are abolished. The question whether a particular ceremony is lawful must therefore be answered by consulting the Prayer Book, not extraneous sources. If a particular ceremony is not retained in the Prayer Book then it is not permitted, regardless of whether it is mediaeval or modern.
The Privy Council observed in Mackonochie that the Preface ‘divides all ceremonies into … 2 classes: those which are retained are specified … none are abolished specifically … but it is assumed that all are abolished which are not expressly retained’ (p.388). This was the essential reason why it overruled Sir Robert.
The Preface emphasised the self-contained, comprehensive character of the Prayer Book as a manual of public worship. Retained ceremonies ‘are so set forth [in the Book of Common Prayer] that every man may understand what they do mean, and to what use they do serve’. This does not require the brains of an Archbishop! The Archbishop’s ‘elaborate exposition’ of history and theology, though impressive in a way, was irrelevant, and perhaps even positively misleading. Phillimore’s erudite judgment in Mackonochie may be open to similar criticism.
This analysis shows that the Prayer Book rule concerning ceremonies was stricter than its rule concerning ornaments. In the blogpost ‘What did the Ornaments Rubric mean?’, filed below, it is argued that the Ornaments Rubric, on its wording, required the use of some ornaments, but did not positively forbid others. The Preface ‘Of Ceremonies’, by contrast, required the use of some ceremonies, but also did positively forbid all others.